South Carolina Law Review
Volume 55
Issue 4 SYMPOSIUM: COURT-ENFORCED
SECRECY

Article 3

Summer 2004

Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: The Case against
Government-Enforced Secrecy
Joseph F. Anderson Jr.
Chief United States District Judge, District of South Carolina

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Anderson, Joseph F. Jr. (2004) "Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: The Case against
Government-Enforced Secrecy," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 55 : Iss. 4 , Article 3.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss4/3

This Symposium Paper is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more
information, please contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Anderson: Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: The Case against Go

HIDDEN FROM THE PUBLIC BY ORDER OF THE
COURT: THE CASE AGAINST GOVERNMENTENFORCED SECRECY
JOSEPH F. ANDERSON JR.'
1.

INTRODUCTION .............................................

A . A Prelude .............................................
B. The ConfidentialityDebate ...............................

712
712
714

II. The South Carolina Experience ...............................
A. Local Rule 5.03: Filing Documents Under Seal ...............
B. ConfidentialityAssociated with Settlements:
Local Rule 5.03(c) ......................................

716
719

III. ARGUMENTS MADE BY THE CONFIDENTIALITY PROPONENTS .........

726

A. "A Deterrentto Settlements" . ............................
B. "The LitigantsHave PrivacyRights" . ....................
C. "Under Existing Rules, Judges Do Not Have to
Go Along with Court-OrderedSecrecy;
Hence, the Rule is Not Necessary". ......................
D. "Secrecy Has a Market Value" . ...........................
E. "The PartiesMay Evade the UnderlyingPurpose
of the Rule by Simply Agreeing to Secrecy Between
Themselves with No Court Involvement'"....................
F. "Sealed Settlements Are Rare" . ...........................
G. "Rule 5.03(c) DiscriminatesAgainst
Those Who Must Have Their Settlements
Approved-Those Whom the Law Otherwise
Seeks to Protect". ......................................
H. "The PlaintiffNeeds Court-OrderedSecrecy". ..............

726
727

IV. THE NEED FOR SUNSHINE .....................................
A.
B.
C.
D.

DuplicativeDiscovery ...................................
Keeping Our Own House in Order .........................
Public Safety ...........................................
Public Confidence in the Legal System ......................

V. CONCLUSION ...............................................

720

727
731

732
738

739
739

740
743
746
748
749

749

* Chief United States District Judge, District of South Carolina.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2004

1

South Carolina
Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 3 [Vol. 55:711
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Wihat transpiresin the court room is public property.
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
I.

INTRODUCTION

A. A Prelude
A visitor to the Office of the Clerk of Court for Aiken County, South Carolina
desiring to learn of the allegations set forth in, and the ultimate resolution of, Civil
Action No. 98-CP-01-1019 would be handed a sealed envelope bearing the
following admonition signed by a state circuit judge:
If anyone involved in this case, the attorneys, the parties, or any
of their representatives should disclose the terms and conditions
of the resolution of this case, they will be in contempt of this
court. IT IS SO ORDERED.
A similar order is attached to the envelope containing the court documents in
the United States District Court Clerk's office in Columbia, South Carolina in Civil
Action No. 3:00-3768:
[T]he entire record in this case, except for this order, including
pleadings, exhibits, hearings, transcripts and prior opinions,
memoranda and orders of this court will be sealed, and access to
it by other persons other than the parties to this case shall be had
only upon further order of this court. AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
The federal district courthouse in the District of Columbia has, in its index of cases,
twelve lawsuits where even the identities of the parties to the dispute are protected
by court-ordered secrecy. The captions in the index for all twelve are identical:
"Sealed v. Sealed."'
These cases, and others like them, typify a discernable and troubling trend in
civil litigation in the United States. Increasingly, litigants are requesting that courts
"approve" a settlement (often in cases where court approval is not required by law)
and, as part of the approval process, enter an order restricting public access to
information about the case and its procedural history. Litigants in such cases, not
content simply to agree between themselves to remain silent about the settlement,
prefer to involve the trial judge in a "take it or leave it" consent order that would
bring the might and majesty of the court system to bear on anyone who breaches the
court-ordered confidentiality called for in the consent order. Trial judges, often

1. Elsa Walsh & Benjamin Weiser, PublicCourts,PrivateJustice: Hundredsof CasesShrouded
in Secrecy, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1988, at Al.
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struggling under the crush of burgeoning case loads and eager to achieve a
settlement, all too frequently acquiesce in the request for court-ordered secrecy
because they are told by counsel that to deny the request means the settlement will
disintegrate and the case will go to trial.
Recent disclosures of sealed settlements in several high profile cases affecting
public safety have served to undermine public confidence in the legal system and
prompted several state legislative bodies and one United States Senator to attempt
to deal with the problem legislatively. In my view, judges must become more
sensitive to the potential mischief that can ensue when they enter secrecy orders
without good reason.
The concept of "secrecy" or "confidentiality" in court proceedings and records
encompasses many things. It can include:
Protective orders that provide that discovery exchanged between
the parties (which by federal rule is not filed with the court)2 will
be kept confidential and not be disclosed to parties outside of the
litigation;
Orders providing that evidence filed with the Clerk of Court is
filed "under seal," meaning that the documents are available to the
litigants and may be reviewed by the court in deciding an issue
before it, but are not available to the public;
The closing of courtrooms so that only the affected parties and
court personnel are present;
Orders "approving" a settlement and requiring one or more of the
following:
A return, by the plaintiff, of all documents produced by
the defendant during discovery;
An agreement by plaintiff and plaintiff s counsel never to
discuss the case or share information about the case;
A "lawyer buyout" provision wherein plaintiff's counsel
agrees not to represent future plaintiffs against the same
defendant;
The sealing of all prior court filings in the case;

2. FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d).
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The vacating or depublishing of substantive orders
previously entered;3
4
The destruction of documents filed with the court;

Stipulations to change the name of the parties so that they
would be unrecognizable to anyone going to the court
file to examine the case;5 and
A requirement that the amount of the monetary
settlement be kept confidential.
B. The ConfidentialityDebate
Over the past twenty years, as civil litigation has mushroomed in the courts of
the United States, the question of the proper role of the judiciary in sanctioning
confidentiality requested, or in many cases, insisted upon by the parties, has been
the subject of extensive scholarly debate.
Professor Laurie Kratky Dor6 divides the opposing camps into what she calls
"confidentiality proponents" and "public access advocates." Confidentiality
proponents, according to Professor Dor6, "highly value the use of confidentiality"
and believe that existing rules (which essentially provide for trial court discretion)
"adequately accommodate the competing interests that arise when secrecy issues
emerge during the course of a lawsuit."6 Professor Arthur Miller of Harvard Law
School, one such proponent, suggests that reformers have exaggerated the extent
of the problems with the current system and argues that judicial discretion to order
confidentiality is a necessary response to the abuse of liberal discovery rules.7
Those who favor the status quo suggest that when a case settles under a

3. For an excellent analysis of the trend toward "vacatur on consent," see Judith Resnik, Whose
Judgment? VacatingJudgments,Preferencesfor Settlement, andthe Role ofAdjudication at the Close
of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471 (1994).

4. Such requests are made, although it is doubtful any court would go along. See Secrecy and the
Courts: The Judges 'Perspective, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 169, 193 (2000) (quoting U.S. District Judge John
G. Koeltl, "One example... [of obligations the parties attempt to impose on the court is that] the court
...destroy all materials [associated with the case] ....It's true!").
5. See generally Richard A. Zitrin, Open Courts with Sealed Files: Secrecy's Impact on
American Justice What Judges Can and Should Do About Secrecy in the Courts, 9 n.4 (Jul. 29, 2000)

(unpublished paper, presented at the 2000 Forum for State Appellate Court Judges,
http://www.roscoepound.org/new/00zitrin.pd0 (referring to cases involving "professionals who did not
want their names sullied by being found in the court record and conditioned settlement on such

'sanitization').

6. Laurie Kratky Dor6, Secrecy by Consent: The Use andLimits of Confidentialityin the Pursuit
of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 303 (1999).
7. See generallyArthur R. Miller, Confidentiality,Protective Orders,and PublicAccess to the
Courts, 105 HARv. L. REv. 427 (1991).
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"confidentiality agreement," the only thing that is generally kept from the public is
the amount of the settlement.
Public access advocates, on the other hand, argue that courts are "publicly
funded government institutions that serve interests broader than those of the
immediate parties." 8 Because they "play a role beyond the resolution of the case at
hand," courts should oppose "attempts by litigants to shield information or
documents that are of public interest or that are relevant to public health and
safety."9 University of San Francisco Law School ethics professor Richard Zitrin,
for example, suggests that "even private disputes take on a quasi-public character
when brought [in] a public forum like a court."' 0 Zitrin contends "there are enough
examples of dangerous products and other threats to safety that have been hidden
behind secrecy agreements to warrant a general policy of openness.""
In this Article, I explain why I believe that the public access advocates have the
better argument. In my view, courts too often rubber-stamp confidentiality orders
presented to them, sometimes altogether ignoring or merely giving lip service to the
body of law and existing court rules that are supposed to apply when the parties
request that discovery documents be filed under seal, that settlements be subject to
a gag order, or that previously filed orders be vacated. I believe court-ordered
secrecy is more prevalent than has been reported (and than most court docket entries
reveal) and the involvement of trial judges in ordering secrecy (as opposed to
simply allowing litigants to keep quiet by agreement) as part of an ongoing effort
to settle cases at all costs is bad policy and is hurting the system of justice that we
all hold dear. I know from experience that litigants frequently attempt to shield
more than the amount of the monetary settlement from public view. I also know
that court orders vacating substantive opinions or requiring the retum or destruction
of discovery documents determined to be relevant and admissible sometimes create
additional work for judges and additional costs to litigants in later cases involving
the same, or a similar, dispute. Unless judges are willing to be more circumspect
in participating in what I prefer to call "government-enforced secrecy," the
legislative branches of government may impose draconian rules that even public
access advocates admit go too far.
The judges of the court on which I sit have attempted to address the issue
through a series of amendments to our local rules. While some might argue our
local rule changes go too far, the national debate that erupted when our rules were
issued for public comment at least helped focus attention on the phenomenon of
government-enforced secrecy. Hopefully, this attention has made trial judges who
are charged with administering the rules that now apply more sensitive to the
competing interests presented when the parties propose a bilateral secrecy
agreement for court approval.
8. Dor6, supra note 6, at 307.

9. Id.
10. Zitrin, supra note 5, at 1.
11. Id.
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Part II of this Article recounts the development of local rules for the District of
South Carolina relating to court-ordered secrecy. Part III addresses and attempts to
debunk most of the principal arguments made by opponents of our local rule
changes. Part IV explains why sunshine is both necessary and desirable in the
institution of government charged with searching for the truth.
II. THE SOUTH CAROLINA EXPERIENCE
From 2000 through 2003 the judges of the United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina promulgated local rules designed to set out standard
procedures to be followed when a litigant proposes to file a document with the court
under seal. They also adopted an outright ban-subject, as will be seen, to an
escape valve that exempts cases where privacy rights are legitimately involved--on
court-ordered secrecy associated with the settlement of a case.
Critics who responded to our invitation for public comment suggested that, at
least as far as secret settlements are concerned, our court was attempting to deal
with a problem that did not exist. I can state from first-hand experience that these
critics are wrong.
In seventeen years on the trial bench, I have been asked to (and in some cases,
I regret to say, did):
Enter orders restricting access to any information about the terms
and amounts of settlement in litigation arising out of a major
aviation disaster;1"
Seal parts of the record and impose court-ordered confidentiality
upon the settlement ofa major surface water contamination case;13
Vacate substantive or dispositive orders previously entered in a
case, thereby removing from the records any precedent that may
have been established on complex legal issues; 4

12. See In re Air Crash at Charlotte, N.C. on July 2, 1994, C/A No. 3:95-1041 (D.S.C.). In this
case, I ordered, at the request of all parties, that the terms and amounts of settlements in thirty-seven

cases arising out of the crash of a major airliner be sealed.
13. See Whitfield v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., C/A No. 6:84-3184 (D.S.C.). This case involved over

350 plaintiffs who asserted a variety of claims against a chemical company that allegedly deposited
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) into Lake Hartwell, a 56,000 acre lake in upstate South Carolina.
For a more complete discussion of this case, see infra note 48 and accompanying text.
14. See Univ. of S.C. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., C/A No. 3:90-2586 (D.S.C. May 15, 1995)

(ordering, at the request of the parties, that two earlier orders granting partial summary judgment,
totaling 160 pages, be vacated as a condition of settlement. These orders resolved thitherto unresolved
insurance coverage questions on a total of eight different insurance policies issued over a period of

twenty years, and involved over fifteen different coverage and exclusion issues applying the law ofNew
York and New Jersey.).
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Cease drafting and not issue a written opinion memorializing an
oral ruling that simply denied a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. 5
In addition, there are court orders on the dockets sealing the settlement terms
in cases where:
A child was killed while riding an allegedly 16defective go-cart
which resulted in a settlement of $1.4 million;
An allegedly defective pharmaceutical, in widespread use in the
United States, resulted in the death of a patient;' 7
A major pharmaceutical chain misfilled a prescription, resulting
in personal injury to the customer; 8
A large cosmetic company settled a claim of race discrimination
filed by one of its employees for a substantial sum.' 9
Perhaps the most striking example of the lengths to which litigants will go to
obtain the court's imprimatur on a confidential settlement occurred in a case that
had been pending on my docket for six years. That case, Johnson v. Collins
Holding Corp.,2 involved claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act against most of the operators of South Carolina's $3 billion video
poker industry. The case, which ultimately resulted in the demise of the video

15. See Craps v. Jim Walter Homes, C/A No. 3:94-3285 (D.S.C.). The court was told that a
condition of the settlement was that the court not complete work on an order that simply reduced to
writing an earlier oral ruling that allowed a case involving an unresolved and hotly disputed issue of
lender liability in South Carolina to go forward.
16. See LeRoy Irby ex rel. Estate of Chauncy L. Irby v. Ken-Bar Mfg. Co., C/A No. 6:01-0718
(D.S.C. Mar. 19, 2001). Although the order approving the settlement is sealed, the petition for court
approval is not, for some reason, thereby disclosing the amount of the settlement. The defendant in the
case still markets several types of go-carts, although it is impossible to tell from the court record
whether the model of go-cart involved in the case is still on the market.
17. See Wayne S. Lown ex rel. Estate of Jeremy A. Lown v. Eli Lilly & Co., C/A No. 3:01-3674
(D.S.C. Sept. 13, 2001).
18. Davis v. Revco Discount Drug Ctr., C/A No. 01-CP-05-90 (S.C. 2d Jud. Cir. (Bamburg)).
19. This case was recounted to me by one of my former law clerks, who represented the plaintiff.
As part of the settlement, she consented not to publicly discuss the resolution of the case and not to
represent any additional plaintiffs against the defendant in that case. For these reasons, I am not at
liberty to identify the case here. It should be noted that to the extent a settlement agreement requires an
attorney to agree not to use information learned during the representation of a party in later
representation against the opposing parties, or a related party, the agreement may well be unethical. See
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 417 (2000). Consent orders containing
such a provision, therefore, seek to have the court approve unethical conduct.
20. C/A No. 3:97-2136 (D.S.C.).
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poker industry in South Carolina,2 involved over one thousand docket entries and

191 court orders. The case evoked intense interest in the news media in South
Carolina and was the subject of a 165-page law review article. 22 Prior to settlement,
the case went to the Supreme Court of South Carolina twice on certified questions
of state law and once to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Shortly before the scheduled trial when the first group of plaintiffs reached a
compromise monetary settlement with the defendants, the attorneys requested a
conference in my chambers. At that conference, the parties asked if I would be
amenable to entering an order approving the settlement and ordering the parties not
to disclose the terms of the settlement. I responded that their timing could not have
been worse: Our court's proposed local rule placing limits on court-ordered secrecy
had been pending for about three months, prompting a national debate on the
subject and focusing attention on the practice in the state and federal courts of South
Carolina. Moreover, the Johnson v. Collins Holding Corp. case was the most
closely-watched case, by the news media, at least, that I had presided over during
my years on the bench. Finally, and no less importantly, Johnson v. CollinsHolding
Corp. was not a class action and the parties were all alive and suijuris. In short,
there was no legal requirement that I "approve" any settlement, much less order that
the settlement papers be sealed. I declined and the case settled in any event.23
Closely related to the issue of court-ordered secrecy associated with the
settlement of civil actions is the question of litigants who seek to file discovery
materials or exhibits "under seal" so that the documents, although available to the
court and the parties associated with the case, will not be available to the general
public. Unlike secret settlements, there is a fairly well-developed body of law in the
Fourth Circuit and elsewhere on the procedures to be followed when litigants
attempt to file documents under seal. Generally, some type of public notice of the
request to file documents under seal is required, followed by a hearing and a court
order making express findings as to why sealing is necessary and explaining why
any lesser alternatives will not suffice.24
Unfortunately, these well-defined rules for sealing court documents are
sometimes more honored in the breach than in the observance. Many lawyers, and
occasionally judges, assume all that is required for the sealing of discovery and
other documents filed with the court is a simple directive from the attorney (or more

21. See R. Randall Bridwell & Frank L. Quinn, From Mad Joy to Misfortune: The Merger of
Law andPolitics in the World of Gambling,72 Miss. L.J. 565, 571 (2002) ("[I]t was a private lawsuit
[Johnson v. Collins Holding Corp.] that finally publicized the problems resulting from South
Carolina's experiment with unlimited and unregulated gambling., and that led to the state's eventual

abolition of gambling.").
22. Id.

23. Ultimately, all defendants settled and none of the settlements was sealed.
24. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2000) (reversing a contempt order
because notice ofsealed settlement was not sufficient); In re Knight Publ'g Co., 743 F.2d 231,235 (4th
Cir. 1984) (stating that the district court "should state the reasons for its decision to seal ... and the
reasons for rejecting alternatives.").
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commonly, the courier for the attorney) filing the documents to the intake deputy
in the Clerk of Court's office."
A.

Local Rule 5.03: FilingDocuments Under Seal

In an effort to establish clear and workable procedures for filing documents
under seal and, perhaps more importantly, to educate the bar about the case law
regarding sealing, the judges of the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina in August 2001 adopted Local Rule 5.03.26 This rule essentially
25. Appellate courts also support the sealing ofdiscovery documents in a close case. For example,
in In re Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., Nos. 94-2254 & 2341, slip op. 2486 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1995), the
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's determination that certain allegedly "smoking gun"
documents could not be filed with the court under seal. Ironically, five years later, that same defendant
was back before the same district court judge, in an unrelated case, defending against similar
allegations of misconduct. See In re Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., C/A No. 3:00-130 (D.S.C.).
26. D.S.C. LOCALR. 5.03. The full text of the 2001 version of Local Rule 5.03 is as follows:
FilingDocumentsUnderSeal. Absent a requirement to seal in the governing rule,
statute, or order, any party seeking to file documents under seal shall follow the
mandatory procedure described below. Failure to obtain prior approval as
required by this Rule shall result in summary denial of any request or attempt to
seal filed documents. Nothing in this Rule limits the ability of the parties, by
agreement, to restrict access to documents which are not filed with the Court. See
Local Civil Rule 26.08.
(A) A party seeking to file documents under seal shall file and serve a "Motion
to Seal" accompanied by a memorandum. See Local Civil Rule 7.04. The
memorandum shall:
(1) identify, with specificity, the documents or portions
thereof for which sealing is requested;
(2) state the reasons why sealing is necessary;
(3) explain (for each document or group ofdocuments) why
less drastic alternatives to sealing will not afford adequate
protection; and
(4) address the factors governing sealing of documents
reflected in controlling case law. E.g., Ashcraft v. Conoco,
Inc., 218 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2000); and In re Knight
Publishing Co., 743 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1984). A nonconfidential descriptive index of the documents at issue
shall be attached to the motion.
A separately sealed attachment labeled "Confidential
Information to be Submitted to Court in Connection with
Motion to Seal" shall be submitted with the motion. This
attachment shall contain the documents at issue for the
Court's in camera review and shall notbe filed. The Court's
docket shall reflect that the motion and memorandum were
filed and were supported by a sealed attachment submitted
for in camera review.
(B) The Clerk shall provide public notice of the Motion to Seal in the manner
directed by the Court. Absent direction to the contrary, this may be
accomplished by docketing the motion in a manner that discloses its nature
as a motion to seal.
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codifies the existing case law on the subject. This local rule was noncontroversial
and has worked well.
In 2003 the district court added a refinement to Local Rule 5.03, promulgating
a standardized protective order that will be accepted and entered by the court upon
agreement of the parties. Many boilerplate protective orders routinely submitted to
judges for approval contain language that is not in conformity with the sealing
requirements of Local Rule 5.03 (notice, hearing, findings). These orders generally
provide that documents produced between the litigants during discovery will not be
disclosed by the parties or the attorneys to persons outside the litigation. Although
these orders often provide for "blanket" confidentiality of all documents produced,
no public interest is implicated because discovery is not filed with the court until it
is necessary to do so in connection with a motion or a trial.27
It is when documents are filed with the court that the language of attorneyprepared or pattern protective orders sometimes runs afoul of Local Rule 5.03 and
related case law. For this reason, judges must scrutinize consent protective orders
submitted by the parties to ensure that they comply. A standardized protective
order, when used by the parties, will relieve judges of the obligation to examine
each and every word of the attorney-prepared order. Nothing in Rule 5.03 prohibits
the parties from submitting a nonstandardized protective order (assuming, of course,
it calls for compliance with the procedural sealing requirements of Local Rule 5.03),
but parties who submit to the court a standardized protective order will benefit from
a safe harbor of sorts: The standardized order will most always meet with the
court's approval.2"
B. Confidentiality Associatedwith Settlements: Local Rule 5.03(c)
In July 2002, the judges of the South Carolina federal court promulgated for
public comment an amendment to Local Rule 5.03, denominated as 5.03(c), which
was designed to address the problem of over-utilization of court-ordered secrecy
associated with the settlement of civil cases. Eschewing nuanced approaches
attempted by other jurisdictions, primarily through legislative enactments, that bar
court-ordered secrecy in cases affecting "the public interest" or "public safety," the
South Carolina federal district's variant of the rule reads simply: "No settlement
agreement filed with the court shall be sealed pursuant to ...[Rule 5.03(c)]."29
As the proponent of our rule change on secret settlements, I was mildly
surprised when the court adopted an antisecrecy rule that was much broader than
I had proposed, especially since the same court (with only three different members)

27. Unlike the practice in most state courts, discovery in the federal court system is generally not

filed with the court. See FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d) (providing that discovery material is not filed with the
court until the materials are used in the proceeding or the court orders filing).

28. A copy of the District of South Carolina's standardized order is attached to this Article in
Appendix A.
29. D.S.C. LOCALR. 5.03(c).
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had rejected a similar proposal by me in 1994.30 My proposed Rule 5.03(c),
presented to the court in 2002, would have affected only a limited number of cases.
It read:
No documents (including court orders) may be sealed in this
district if the documents contain information concerning matters
that have a probable adverse effect upon the general public health

or safety, or the administration of public office, or the operation
of government."

30. My 1994 rule change proposal garnered exactly one vote-my own.
31. Letter from Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of South
Carolina, to the twelve South Carolina U.S. District Judges (July 11, 2002) (on file with author). The
letter read as follows:
The
The
The
The
The
The

Honorable
Honorable
Honorable
Honorable
Honorable
Honorable
In re:

C. Weston Houck
G. Ross Anderson, Jr.
David C. Norton
Dennis W. Shedd
Henry M. Herlong, Jr.
Cameron M. Currie

The Honorable
The Honorable
The Honorable
The Honorable
The Honorable
The Honorable

Patrick Michael Duffy
Margaret B. Seymour
Terry L. Wooten
Sol Blatt, Jr.
Matthew J. Perry, Jr.
Falcon B. Hawkins

Court-Ordered Secrecy Agreements

Dear Judges:
I have had several quiet days this week and thus have had the opportunity to look at a lot of
materials regarding court-ordered secrecy agreements. I would like to summarize in this letter several
things I have learned which I think suggest that our court should bar these agreements in our district.
I would like to share them with you so that you can review them in advance of the next meeting.
El

Court-ordered secrecy agreements adversely affect public safety ....

Q

Secrecy agreements, (which typically require the plaintiff s attorney to return all documents
that have been produced and agree to never disclose the existence of those documents)
perpetuate messy discovery battles. As I mentioned in an earlier letter, I went through an
extremely difficult case involving documents buried in a giant warehouse and when the case
settled, the defendant insisted that the documents be returned and never discussed. This
means that the next judge who had such a case (involving, as I recall, a defective piece of
logging equipment) might have to go through the same discovery nightmare that I did. This
is a waste ofjudicial resources as well as an unnecessary and expensive burden on litigants.

Q

For a judge to sign an order requiring an attorney not to disclose information he or she has
learned in representing a client may be condoning unethical conduct by the attorney. See
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility formal opinion No. 00417 (a copy of which was previously provided to you).

Q

One of my law clerks asked me why it was necessary to have a blanket rule in our court
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While at first blush Rule 5.03(c), as adopted, may appear to be rigid and
inflexible, admitting no exceptions, it must be read in conjunction with another local
rule that provides an escape valve for cases in which a legitimate need for court-

when each judge is free to simply reject secrecy agreements if he or she is opposed to them.
Here is the problem with that: When the plaintiff s lawyer and the defendant's lawyer come
to a judge after a long, contentious legal battle and announce to the judge that they have
reached an amicable settlement whereby the plaintiff will receive, for example, $2 million
for injuries which have rendered him a quadriplegic, contingent on thejudge signing an order
sealing the record and requiring the return of all documents, the judge is in a real quandary:
If the judge wants to reject the secrecy agreement as a matter of principle, he or she may do
so, and then the case will go to trial. If plaintiff then loses, the judge has cost that plaintiff
a favorable settlement because the judge wants to promote openness in the court system. In
other words, there is an incredible amount of pressure brought to bear on a judge when a
favorable settlement is reached contingent on a secrecy agreement. If we outlaw them
altogether (that is to say, if we take the secrecy agreement offthe table as a bargaining chip),
individual judges would avoid this quandary and its attendant risks.

0

Last Friday I received a call from Chief Justice Jean Toal who had learned of my efforts on
this matter and was interested in looking at the materials I have collected. After I sent them
to her, she informed me that she intends to make a strong push at the state judges' judicial
conference in August to outlaw secrecy agreements in state court. Although, no one can tell
for certain, I suspect that if Jean Toal advances this matter with her usual resourcefulness,
we will see this change occur on the state level. We thus have the opportunity to work in
tandem with our state court brothers and sisters just as we did approximately one year ago
on our rule change regarding Rule 403 for law clerks.

Il

Finally, I think that we should outlaw secrecy agreements because it's just the right thing to
do. How many times have we heard that South Carolina is last on the lists where we should
be first and first on the lists where we should be last? Here is a rare opportunity for our court
to do the right thing, and take the lead nationally in a time when the Arthur
Andersen/Enron/Catholic priest controversies are undermining public confidence in our
institutions and causing a growing suspicion of things that are kept in secret by public
bodies.

For all these reasons, I strongly think that our court should adopt a local rule barring secrecy
agreements executed in connection with the settlement of a case involving public safety. My proposed
rule (modeled loosely on the Florida rule) would read as follows:
No documents (including court orders) may be sealed in this district if the
documents contain information concerning matters that have a probable adverse
effect upon the general public health or safety, or the administration of public
office, or the operation of government.
With kind personal regards, I am,
Yours very truly,

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
JFA;JR: rdp
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ordered secrecy can be demonstrated. Local Rule 1.02 provides that "[f]or good
cause shown in a particular case, the court may suspend or modify any local rule."
Read together, Local Rules 1.02 and 5.03(c) establish apreferencefor openness at
settlement, while still preserving the ability of the presiding judge to seal a
settlement when, for example, proprietary information or trade secrets need to be
protected, or a particularly vulnerable party needs to be shielded from the glare of
an otherwise newsworthy settlement.
I remain of the opinion that the more limited version of the rule that I proposed
is all that was needed to address the problem that I perceived. There are some who
defend the broader rule passed by our court because they believe that the rule, read
together with the escape valve of Local Rule 1.02, achieves essentially the same
result: The judges of our court will scrutinize more carefully, and quite possibly
reject, requests to seal settlements in cases where court-ordered secrecy might have
some deleterious effect on the public.32
How did it occur that a court that soundly rejected an antisecrecy proposal in
1994 did such an about-face and adopted a rule change in 2002 that was even
broader than its proponent had suggested? As the Greek poet Hesiod said, "right
33
timing is in all things the most important factor."
In the spring of 2002, The State, South Carolina's largest daily newspaper, ran
a three-part series by news columnist John Monk on medical negligence litigation
in South Carolina. The last of these articles focused exclusively on court-ordered
confidentiality that was associated with the settlement of virtually all medical
34
negligence cases in the South Carolina state courts. The Monk article pointed out
the general belief that a small number of physicians are involved in a
disproportionately high number of negligence cases. It also noted that identifying
these physicians is difficult because of the behavior of judges who obligingly seal
the settlement and restrict access to information about the case.
Near the same time The State ran its articles, a national furor erupted over
confidentiality orders allegedly entered in early cases involving motorists injured
by tires manufactured by Bridgestone/Firestone, as well as Goodyear, and children
abused by Catholic priests. According to news articles, court orders in some of the
early cases kept the public in the dark about existing and ongoing threats to public

32. Our court's proposed rule, but not the escape valve of Local Rule 1.02, was widely publicized
in the news media and in legal journals. As a result, the proposed rule, which appeared on its face to
be the most draconian of any rule enacted in any jurisdiction thus far, generated a national debate on
the issue of court-ordered secrecy generally. The publicity and debate probably would not have been
as intense if my milder version of the rule had been put forth by the court. I believe this national debate
was beneficial if for no other reason than it brought the issue to the forefront, and perhaps made all
participants in the administration ofjustice more sensitive to the issue of court-ordered secrecy.
33. Hesiod, The Theogony, 1.1, available at The Online Medieval & Classical Library,
http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/OMACL/Hesiod (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
34. John Monk, MedicalMistakes Kept Secret, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), June 18, 2002, at
Al. Since a doctor and patient generally live in the same state, there is rarely diversity of citizenship
in medical negligence cases; hence, the vast majority of these cases are litigated in state courts.
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safety, resulting in more people being injured or killed when riding on defective
tires and more children being abused by priests with whom they associated. 5
The publicity associated with these developments provided the impetus needed
to pass the antisecrecy provision of Local Rule 5.03(c). On July 31, 2002, South

35. The following excerpts are typical of the many news articles castigating the judicial system
around the country during the relevant time period: "Some victims of accidents involving Ford and
Firestone have settled their lawsuits confidentially. Many state judges routinely seal product-liability
lawsuits, making it difficult for federal officials-or anyone else-to spot trends." Stephen Power,
Agency Probes ofAuto Defects are Hampered, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2000, at A3.
[Secret settlements are] a practice that [have] become commonplace in the past
20 years, in which the amount of settlements are hidden, as well as details of a
product's dangers. Companies limit bad publicity, victims get larger settlements,
and busy court dockets are cleared.
[A] West Virginia University football player [] died in March 1997 when the
tread of a Firestone ATX tire separated on his Explorer, causing the vehicle to roll
over. Georgia attorney Rowe Brogdon found dozens of similar lawsuits, but
attorneys couldn't talk about their cases because of confidentiality agreements.
In some cases, judges order the return of documents to Ford and Firestone.
The protective orders on documents, combined with confidentiality
agreements in settlements, allowed Ford and Firestone to maintain publicly that
there were no known problems with the tires even as they continued to settle cases
across the country for millions of dollars.
Ron French, Tire Death Secrets Sought, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 19, 2000, at 1A.
[L]awyers say protective orders have snuffed out early warning signals about
dangerous products, posing a threat to public health and forcing injured plaintiffs
to litigate their cases without the benefit of documents that have been sealed in
prior cases. Over the years, protective orders have sealed information-at least
temporarily-in liability cases involving such products as breast implants, Bic
lighters, all-terrain vehicles and Agent Orange.
Richard B. Schmitt, Critics Say Courts Seal Too Much Data,WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1995, at B i.
A Connecticut Superior Court judge accused his state's judiciary this week
of longstanding complicity in the Diocese of Bridgeport's efforts to keep hidden
from the public the extent of clergy sexual abuse, including a church "cover-up,"
which the judge said is "at the heart of the scandal."
In extraordinary language aimed at the Connecticut Appellate Court, which
has delayed his order that seven boxes of secret documents be made public,
[Judge Robert F.] McWecny declared that it is "indefensible morally as well as
legally" to keep the documents under court seal. Even the delay, he said,
"precludes any timely vindication of any public right to access this compelling
information."
The Bridgeport Diocese, he continued, "though unsuccessful in nearly every
legal claim it has asserted, has nonetheless for years shielded these materials from
public review. Connecticut courts have facilitated this process ... [by] sealing the
files over the objections of the victims .... "
Walter V. Robinson, Connecticut Courts Helped Hide Abuse, Judge Says, BOSTON GLOBE, June 14,
2002, at Al.
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Carolina district judges unanimously voted to submit the rule for public comment.
Reaction to our proposed rule was swift and the rhetoric was heated.
Approximately two hundred pages of commentary were filed with the Clerk of
Court's office. Generally speaking, insurance and business interests and defense
attorneys opposed the rule. News media organizations, the organized plaintiffs' bar
(but not necessarily all plaintiffs' lawyers individually), and public interest groups
such as Common Cause and RalphNader's organization, Citizen Works, supported
the proposed rule. 3' The debate contained in the public commentary revealed that
the opposing camps were deeply divided with little hope of any middle ground
alternative acceptable to both sides. Members of our court were either hailed as
or criticized as neanderthals who would end the
modem day Thomas Jeffersons"
39
it.
know
we
as
law
of
practice
After receiving and reviewing the comments of all interested parties, and after
debate and discussion at a November 1, 2002 judges meeting, the South Carolina
District Court adopted Local Rule 5.03(c) as promulgated. The vote was 8-2. Our
40
court thus joined at least twenty other jurisdictions that have adopted some form

36. In addition to posting the proposed new rule on the District Court website and advertising in
legal magazines, our court invited the presidents of five bar organizations in South Carolina, as well
as three ethics professors from the University of South Carolina School ofLaw, to comment on the rule.
37. The responses were all posted on the website of the District of South Carolina and may be
viewed at http://www.scd.uscourts.gov (last visited Apr. 2, 2004) (on file with author).
38. See E-mail from Kenneth G. Harper to Judy Matras, Deputy Clerk of Court, District of South
Carolina (Sept. 2, 2002) (describing the court as "secur[ing] [its] name in history with the likes of
Oliver Wendell-Holmes, Thomas Jefferson, and Teddy Roosevelt as a true protector of the people for
the people, by the people") (on file with author).
39. One attorney has suggested that American soldiers have fought in the Mideast Gulf wars to
prevent the type of privacy invasion an antisecrecy rule would bring about. Bill Ainsworth, Business
Lobbying to Kill Secret Settlements Bill, THE RECORDER, May 15, 1991, at 1.
40. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., Sup. CT. R. 123 (West Supp. 2003) (governing public
access to judicial records); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-18-401 to -403, 16-55-122 (Michie 2002)
(prohibiting the sealing of government documents and voiding agreements that restrict disclosures of
environmental hazards); CAL. R. APP. P. 12.5,56 (governing sealed documents on appellate review and
stating procedures for appealing the trial court's ruling on sealing); CAL. CT. R. 243.1-243.4 (governing
sealed records at trial); DEL. Sup. CT. R. ANN. 9(bb) (Michie 2003) (governing sealing of court
records); DEL. CH. CT. R. 5(g) (governing sealing of court records); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West
Supp. 2004) (prohibiting concealment of public hazards); GA. SUPER. CT. R. 21 (setting forth procedure
for limiting access to court files); IDAHO CT. R. 32(f) (requiring least restrictive means for sealing
documents and written findings by the court); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-5.5 (Michie 2001) (placing
burden on proponent to establish that policy of openness is outweighed by factors favoring sealing);
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § § 224.10-210, -440 (Michie 2002) (stating policy that records and hearings are
open to the public); L.A. COUNTY SUPER. CT. R. 12.20 (disfavoring confidentiality agreements and
protective orders); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1426 (West Supp. 2002) (governing protective
orders); MAss. R. IMPOUNDMENT P. (requiring motion requesting documents and exhibits sealed be
supported by affidavit); MICH. STAT. ANN. R. 8.105 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (prohibiting court from
entering sealed order unless party files written motion, court makes written finding of good cause, and
no less restrictive means are available); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.0385 (Michie 2002) (stating claims
against government agencies are public records); N.J. CT. R. § 4:10-3 (governing protective orders);
N.Y. CT. R. §§ 216.1, 3103 (governing sealing of court records and protective orders); N.C. GEN. STAT.
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of sunshine provision for their courts and became the first federal court to do so by
local rule.
III. ARGUMENTS MADE BY THE

CONFIDENTIALITY PROPONENTS

Those who favor the status quo (and therefore opposed Local Rule 5.03(c))
advanced a number of arguments-some of which may be easily dismissed and
some of which merit more extended discussion.
A.

"A Deterrentto Settlements"

Opponents of Local Rule 5.03(c) suggested that its adoption would discourage
settlements, thereby flooding our already-overburdened court system with more
trials than it can handle. The argument was based upon the somewhat illogical
concept that if litigants could no longer attempt to cajole a judge into ordering a
secret settlement, then the parties would necessarily opt for the most public of all
resolutions-a trial before a jury in an open courtroom.
Statistics compiled since the implementation of Local Rule 5.03(c) easily refute
this argument. In South Carolina, the judges in our district court actually tried two
fewer cases in the twelve months following the promulgation of Local Rule 5.03(c)
than they did in the immediately preceding twelve-month period.4 Nor were
litigants discouraged from filing in our federal court after 5.03(c) was adopted:
Civil filings for the twelve-month period following Rule 5.03(c)'s adoption were
up by 384 cases over the preceding twelve months.42

§ 132-1.3(b) (2003) (prohibiting sealing of settlement document unless overriding interest overcomes
policy of openness, and no other less restrictive means are available); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.402 (2001)
(prohibiting sealing of settlement with governmental agency); SAN DIEGO COUNTY SUPER. CT. R. 11.6
(stating policy that confidentiality agreements and protective orders approved only when genuine trade
secret or privilege protected); S.F. COUNTY SUPER. CT. R. 10.5 (disfavoring sealing of documents);
TEX. R. Civ. P. § 76a(l) (requiring specific, serious and substantial interest clearly outweigh
presumption of openness); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01 (Michie 2000) (allowing materials covered
by a protective order in personal injury and wrongful death actions to be voluntarily shared with
attorney in a related action with permission of the court after notice and hearing); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 4.24.601, 611 (West Supp. 2004) (declaring public right to information regarding public
health and safety). ROSCOE POUND INST., MATERIALS ON SECRECY PRACTICES IN THE COURTS (2000).

See generallyDor6, supra note 6 (suggesting a balancing approach to litigation confidentiality using
the principle objectives of the right of public access to judicial proceedings).

41. E-mail from Sandy Roberson, Deputy Clerk of Court, U.S. District Court for the District of
South Carolina, to Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Chief Judge, Federal District of South Carolina (Aug. 26,

2003) (on file with author).
42. Id. Civil filings for the twelve months preceding Local Rule 5.03(c) were 5,785, while filings

for the next twelve months were 6,169, an increase of 6.6%. Id.
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B.

"The LitigantsHave Privacy Rights"

Perhaps the most bogus of all contentions against the antisecrecy rule is the
straw argument that litigants do not shed their constitutional right to privacy at the
courthouse door.43 The implication is that the antisecrecy rule somehow prevents
the parties from agreeing between themselves to settle a case with both sides
agreeing not to talk about the case. The parties had this right before Rule 5.03(c)
was adopted, and they have it now.
Rule 5.03(c) addresses court-orderedsecrecy, i.e., a settlement whereby the
parties consent to an order of the court directing that the settlement, the court
documents, or whatever else the parties agree upon, remain secret. It is one thing
to say that the parties have the right, as they do, to agree upon secrecy interse; it is
quite another to suggest that there is some legal right to force a judge to sign an
order requiring that the parties "hush up" on pain of contempt of court."
In the month following adoption of Rule 5.03(c), I participated in four panel
debates on the topic of "secret settlements." The opponents on the other side of the
table, without fail, raised the so-called privacy issue as their principal argument. In
each debate, no panelist on the other side of the issue would address the principal
points made herein-that Rule 5.03(c) does not prevent private agreements on
secrecy, but only government-enforced secrecy.
C. "Under Existing Rules, Judges Do Not Have to Go Along with CourtOrderedSecrecy; Hence, the Rule is Not Necessary"
This statement is a valid argument in opposition to Rule 5.03(c), but one that
ignores the human dynamic that comes into play when judges are presented with
consent secrecy orders.
Consider the following scenario, which is not unusual in the life of a trial judge.
A judge is in his or her office, reviewing motions in limine filed in an upcoming
civil trial that is scheduled to begin the following Monday and last three weeks.
The lawyers in the case call to advise the judge that they need to see the judge in
chambers with some good news. Upon arrival, they announce to the judge that they
have reached a compromise settlement: The defendant will pay the plaintiff the sum
of $1.75 million in exchange for a full release. The lawyers then say,

43. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 7, at 466 ("Litigants do not give up their privacy rights simply
because they have walked voluntarily or involuntarily, through the courthouse door.").
44. Attorney Daniel A. Speights of Hampton, South Carolina once told me that when he was a
law clerk to state Circuit Judge William Rhodes, the judge often remarked that it seemed odd to him

that lawyers assumed that when they presented an order to the judge consented to by the attorneys for
both sides, the judge had to sign the order simply because both lawyers had already signed it. Judge
Rhodes was right: A judge is under no obligation to rubber-stamp an order merely because it is a

consent order.
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We are delighted we were able to come to terms and amicably
settle this case. You can stop pouring over those motions in
limine, and you now have three weeks to devote to those
upcoming drug conspiracy trials. Oh, by the way, there is just one
more thing we agreed upon to make this settlement work. We
have prepared this order, to which all the parties have consented,
that simply protects everybody involved.
The judge reads the consent order which provides for:
Total confidentiality on the terms of settlement, to be enforced by
the court's contempt power;
A retum by the plaintiff of all documents produced during
discovery;
A prohibition on plaintiffs counsel and plaintiff discussing the
case; and
The vacating of substantive orders entered in the case, thereby
removing this precedent from the record.45
If the judge signs this order, everyone will be happy: The plaintiff recovers a

45. The practice of vacating previously entered orders to effectuate a settlement is, in my view,
a problem related to court-ordered secrecy, but one that is generally beyond the scope of this Article.
Suffice it to say that, like court-ordered secrecy, vacatur on consent represents a troubling trend in civil
litigation. Just as with secret settlements, a form of "pecuniary sweetener" is used to facilitate the
erasing of a part of the public court record.
To give just one example, in 1992, 1 presided over a nonjury insurance coverage dispute dealing
with the duty of four different insurers to defend and indemnify a contractor that installed asbestos in
several buildings at the University of South Carolina during the 1960s and 1970s. My opinion finding
partial coverage in the case-which involved four insurers who issued eight policies over a period of
twenty years, each containing fifteen exclusions, requiring me to predict the law of two different states
(New York and New Jersey)-produced 160 pages of analysis. Univ. of S.C. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am.,
C/A No. 3:90-2586-17 (D.S.C. May 15, 1995). While the appeal was pending, the parties settled, but
only on the condition that I vacate my opinion. As a newcomer to the bench, I went along, issuing a
one-sentence order undoing all of the earlier work I had done. Id. There were potentially more than two
dozen ways the case could be reversed and I reasoned that I was saving the court of appeals, and quite
possibly myself, additional work.
After seventeen years on the bench, I no longer go along with consent vacatur requests. I agree
with the sentiments of Chief Judge Sherman Finesilver: "Vacatur allows disappointed litigators
effectively to rewrite history. [It] allows them to control the direction and content ofjurisprudence-to
weed out the negative precedent and preserve the positive-and create an artificially weighty and onesided estimate of what comprises 'the case law."' Benavides v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 820 F.
Supp. 1284, 1289 (D. Colo. 1993)." For a thorough examination of the different views on the use of
vacatur, see Resnik, supra note 3.
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handsome sum, both lawyers get paid, the defendant gets its court-ordered secrecy,
the judge has one less case to try, and there is no one around to object to the secrecy
order.
But suppose the case involves an allegedly defective product and the judge is
aware that the product is still on the market, or a teacher who has molested a child
and the judge knows that the teacher is still in the classroom, or a telemarketer who
has swindled an elderly couple out of their life savings and the judge knows that the
telemarketer is still in operation. What does the judge do then?
Critics of our rule say that the court should, and will, always do the right thing
and look out for the public interest by refusing to sign the secrecy order. But if the
judge refuses, the case then goes to trial and a potentially deserving plaintiff may
recover nothing because the judge has rejected the settlement.
In other words, judges face incredible pressure to go along with court-ordered
secrecy in the heat of battle.46 As Judge Judith McConnell of the San Diego,
California, Superior Court told interviewer Lynn Sherr on the ABC news magazine
20/20:
In the olden days, I would sign an order that stipulated that the
moon was made out of cheese if the lawyers came in and asked
me to sign it and we routinely signed orders because they didn't
create any work for us and they resolved issues and there was no
one around asking that anything else be done.47
The surface water contamination case referred to in Part II is illustrative.48 The
case involved over 350 plaintiffs who contended that they were injured when the
defendant deposited polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) into Lake Hartwell, a 56,000
acre public lake on the Savannah River in upstate South Carolina. The case
included traditional property value diminution claims as well as many personal
injury claims asserting the plaintiffs developed cancer and other diseases as a result
of being exposed to the lake water.
The first judge assigned to the case was appointed to the court of appeals. The
judge who inherited his docket handed it off to me shortly after I was appointed.
The case promised to be a daunting task for a neophyte judge; it had been pending
for three years and the trial was predicted to last six months.
After receiving the case, I conducted a summary jury trial in front of an

46. See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion ofthe PublicRealm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2649
(1995) (observing "the basic scenario" under which "the court, eager to close the case, mindful that
'facilitating the settlement' ... is a stated objective.. . under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ... , and understanding that the secrecy stipulations are the sine qua non for the plaintiff
achieving a generous settlement, or perhaps any settlement at all, seals the records of the case").
47. 20/20: The Secrets They Keep (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 29, 1992) (on file with
author).
48. Whitfield v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., C/A No. 6:84-3184 (D.S.C.).
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advisory jury in an effort to provide a catalyst for settlement. When the advisory
jury quickly returned a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiffs' settlement demand
was reduced and the parties engaged in earnest settlement negotiations. Ultimately,
the parties structured a novel arrangement: The defendant would pay $3.5 million
into a fund that would be used to set up a medical monitoring and primary medical
care program for all 350 plaintiffs who lived near the lake. The bulk of the
settlement funds was given to the Medical University of South Carolina, who
agreed to enter into a contract with a physician with an office near the plaintiffs.
Under this contract, the physician would furnish free primary medical care to all the
plaintiffs for the duration of their lives. Also, the Medical University, working with
the physician, would conduct epidemiological studies on all the plaintiffs and
monitor their medical condition in an effort to learn more about the long-term health
effects of exposure to PCBs. A small amount of the settlement money would be
used for a per capita distribution to each plaintiff.
The plan had all of the markings of a "win/win" settlement: The plaintiffs
received free medical care for life, plus a monetary settlement; the defendant earned
considerable good will for providing for plaintiffs' medical needs; and the Medical
University and the local physician received accolades for spearheading such an
innovative program.
Because the group of plaintiffs included some minors and others whose
settlements required court approval, it was necessary for me to review and approve
the settlement. During the approval process, I was told that court-ordered secrecy
at settlement, and a return of all "smoking gun" documents, was a non-negotiable
prerequisite to the entire settlement: If I did not go along, the carefully crafted
package would fall apart and the case would move forward to a six-month trial.
Moreover, inasmuch as the summary jury had already returned a verdict for the
defendant after less than thirty minutes of deliberation, it was entirely possible that
the plaintiffs would recover nothing at the conclusion of the trial and all subsequent
appeals. As a judge with six months experience on the bench and other difficult
cases awaiting me, I went along with the request for court-ordered secrecy.
At a conference of Chief United States District Judges in Washington on April
30, 2003, a United States District Judge (who I will not identify except to say that
she is not from the Massachusetts area) told me that she never signs secrecy orders
because of an experience in her past. She told me that twenty years ago, she was
assigned a case involving allegations of sexual abuse by a church leader. She went
along with a request to order that the case, or some aspect of it, be kept secret. She
was told at the time that the alleged perpetrator was permanently leaving her area.
She later learned that the church had actually transferred him to a distant region and
that he later returned to her district and died of AIDS. She says that she has
regretted her decision for twenty years and that she will never sign another consent
secrecy order.
Judges who have not had such an enlightening experience may not have the will
to reject consent secrecy orders when they are not appropriate. An antisecrecy rule
takes court-ordered secrecy off the table as a bargaining chip. It might seem odd
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss4/3
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to suggest that life-tenured federal judges are as vulnerable as Ulysses, who had to
tether himself to his ship so that he would not be lured away by the sirens'
temptations, but the simple fact is that judges all too often yield to expediency in
order to settle a case. 49 The sealed settlements noted at the beginning of this Article
are merely representative examples. There are many others.50

D. "Secrecy Has a Market Value"
Perhaps the most bizarre argument against Local Rule 5.03(c) was the one
voiced by some plaintiffs' lawyers who said that court-ordered secrecy gives them
the opportunity to leverage a little more money out of the defendant at settlement
time. 5 For example, a personal injury case is worth $600,000 for a routine

settlement, but the settlement value goes up to $750,000 if the plaintiff and his
counsel consent to a gag order. According to Time magazine, the early Catholic
priest controversies involving pedophilia proceeded in a "culture of secrecy."5 2 In
the early cases, "[I]f a victim finally sued, the strategy was to admit nothing, buy

silence, settle out of court and seal the deal with a confidentiality contract."53 As
settlements,
plaintiffs' lawyer Allan Kanner told a major publication after one of''5 his
4
up.
shut
to
money
of
ton
a
client
my
paid
"They [the defendants]
What this means is secrecy-court-orderedsecrecy, government-enforced
secrecy-is a commodity that has a market value and is bought and paid for, notjust

49. One federal judge has even suggested that a neutral ombudsman be utilized to determine
secrecy issues, given the courts' "conflict of interest" in securing settlements and clearing their dockets.
Jack B. Weinstein, EthicalDilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REv. 469, 517 (1994).
50. The reader will observe that some of the confidential settlements referred to in Part II of this
Article are cases that I have presided over. See supra notes 12 through 15 and accompanying text. In
my defense, I would point out that these cases came earlier in my career when I labored under the belief
that the overriding goal ofjudges was to settle cases. My views on the desirability of settlement have
evolved. Although I agree that our system depends heavily on compromise settlements, I share the views
espoused by Professor Judith Resnik of Yale Law School who believes there is an overemphasis on
settlement. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error,Jurisdictionas Injury: Transformingthe Meaning of
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REv. 924 (2000). Professor Resnik finds it ironic that members of a
profession whose title is "trial judge" often view those cases that go to trial as "failures" of the system.
Id. at 925-26. Fifth Circuit Appellate Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham has voiced similar sentiments.
Patrick E. Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. REv. 1405, 1423
(2002) ("Ultimately, law unenforced by courts is no law. We need trials, and a steady stream of them,
to ground our normative standards-to make them sufficiently clear that persons can abide by them in
planning their affairs-and never face the courthouse-the ultimate settlement. Trials reduce disputes,
and it is a profound mistake to view a trial as a failure of the system.").
51. See Kate Marquess, South CarolinaMoves Toward Squelching Secrecy, 30 A.B.A. J. EREPORT 6 (2002) ("'[The proposed rule is] not good for the individual plaintiff,' says Richard A.
Harpootlian, a civil litigator in Columbia, [South Carolina]. Harpootlian says a case may be worth more
if the plaintiff agrees to settle quietly. 'That's an element that I use to negotiate the settlement."').
52. Johanna McGeary, Can the Church Be Saved?, TIME, Apr. 1, 2002, at 29, 30.
53. Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
54. Editorial, Debate: Open Court Records to ProtectPublic, USA TODAY, Mar. 16, 1989, at

Published by Scholar Commons, 2004

21

South Carolina
LawCAROLINA
Review, Vol.
55, Iss.
4 [2004], Art. 3 [Vol. 55: 711
SOUTH
LAW
REVIEW

under the judge's nose, but with the judge's complicity. In my view, courts in civil
cases operate to seek the truth and to right wrongs; they do not exist to participate
in an exercise where the judge's signature is for sale."
E. "The PartiesMay Evade the Underlying Purpose of the Rule by Simply
Agreeing to Secrecy Between Themselves with No Court Involvement"
Although it is true that litigants may always settle a case on the basis of
contractual secrecy, a so-called "contract of silence," this is not a strong argument
against adoption of Local Rule 5.03(c). As noted previously, nothing in 5.03(c)
prohibits bilateral secrecy covenants between the litigants. Indeed, in my view,
there is no way a rule could legitimately ban such agreements.
The evil that 5.03(c) is designed to address is court involvement in the business
of enforcing secrecy. Litigants, however, are often discontent to walk away with
a mere contract not to talk. They want the judge's signature, and the corresponding
contempt power of the court, to legitimize their conduct and to have assurance that
a violation will be summarily dealt with by the court. 6
Litigants may want court-ordered secrecy for other, less pure, motives as well.
A few examples follow.
In an article entitled System Helps Hide Hospitals' Mistakes, Durham (NC)
Herald-Sun writer Jim Shamp reports that "closed-door settlements may allow
hospitals and doctors to deny culpability and circumvent error-reporting
requirements of regulatory agencies.""7 Shamp explains that hospitals are required
to report to the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO) "all 'sentinel events,' meaning any unexpected outcome resulting in a
patient death or permanent loss of function. "" Shamp contends that underreporting
to the JCAHO is rampant. Since the sentinel event reporting requirements started
in 1995, there have been 1,959 events reported. Meanwhile, a 1999 report by the

55. Judicial confirmation that secrecy has a market value was recently provided by the United
States Tax Court. In Amos v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 2003-329 (2003), a tax dispute arose from an

incident involving an assault by a professional basketball player (Dennis Rodman) on a sports
photographer during a game. The player paid the photographer $200,000 to settle the case and the

agreement included typical secrecy provisions.
The IRS Commissioner attempted to treat the entire amount of the settlement as taxable income
on the ground that the IRS believed that there had been little, if any, actual physical injury to the
photographer. The Tax Court disagreed with the Commissioner's determination that all of the
settlement was income, but it held that the unspecified portion of the settlement that was paid for
secrecy was taxable income. The court valued the secrecy part of the settlement at $80,000 and ordered
the photographer to include that amount in his taxable income of the year in question. Id.
56. As Professor Laurie Kratky Dord has observed, "many litigants are not content to rely upon

contractual confidentiality clauses and additionally seekjudicial imprimatur of their compromise, either
by filing it for approval with the court or requesting that it be otherwise embodied in a court order
containing confidentiality or sealing provisions." Dor6, supra note 6, at 384-85.
57. THE HERAID-SUN, Mar. 9,2003, at Al.
58. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss4/3

22

Hidden FROM
from the
Public
by Order
of theOFCourt:
The Case against Go
2004]Anderson:HIDDEN
THE COURT
BY ORDER
THE
PUBLIC

National Academies of Science's Institute of Medicine entitled "To Err is Human"
linked as many as 98,000 deaths per year to medical errors in United States
hospitals. Shamp's premise is that some institutions may not report because the
institutions hide behind gag orders issued by judges-orders that they invited the
judges to sign. 9

A similar phenomenon may be occurring in the products liability area. The
Consumer Product Safety Act requires that the manufacturer of a consumer product
self report to the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) when the product
is the subject of three verdicts or settlements arising out of claims for death or
severe bodily injury.60 Between 1991 (when the reporting requirement began) and
2002, there have been 551 reports to the CPSC.6' During this same period of time,
there have been 156,085 product liability lawsuits filed in the federal court system
alone.62 Of course, it is possible, though unlikely, that the vast majority of those
cases were resolved with a verdict for the defendant. It is also possible that massive
under-reporting is occurring because litigants hide behind gag orders issued by the
court at settlement.
I recall at least one occasion where the attorneys in an excessive force case
against law enforcement officers asked me to seal the settlement in the case,
notwithstanding the fact that the State of South Carolina has a policy against sealed
settlements.63 These attorneys candidly admitted that they were seeking to gain an
advantage for the city the officers worked for in later litigation. Specifically,
political subdivisions such as municipalities may not be held liable for constitutional
violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the plaintiff can prove a "pattern or
custom" of such conduct." The attorneys apparently believed that "sealing" the

59. Id.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 2084 (2000).
61. E-mail from Marc J.Schoem, Director, Recalls and Compliance Division, Office of
Compliance, CPSC, to Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of South
Carolina (Aug. 13, 2003, 10:24 am) (on file with author). "[T]he U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Commission administers section 37 of the Consumer Product Safety Act [ 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2085],
Section 37 requires manufacturers of consumer products to report information about settled or
adjudicated lawsuits during [any given] two year periods. The Commission [has promulgated] a rule
interpreting the requirements of section 37 at 16 C.F.R. Part 1116. The first reporting period was
Since 2002, 551 reports have been received under
January 1, 1991 through December 31, 1992 .
section 37. Id.
62. Memorandum from Sandy Roberson, Deputy Clerk of Court, U.S. District Court for the
District of South Carolina, to Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Chief Judge, Federal District of South Carolina
(Aug. 12, 2003) (relaying information from the Statistics Division of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts) (on file with author). This figure does not include asbestos cases, which are
quantified separately. Id.
63. See infra note 85.
64. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,694 (1978) (holding "a local government may
not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when
execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts
or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity
is responsible under § 1983.").

Published by Scholar Commons, 2004

23

South Carolina
Law CAROLINA
Review, Vol.LAW
55, Iss.
4 [2004], Art. 3 [Vol. 55: 711
SOUTH
REVIEW

settlement would prevent the actions of the officer in that case from being used in
later litigation to establish a custom on the part of the city.
Scott Ritter, a former arms inspector with the United Nations team charged with
looking for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in the years leading up to the 2003
conflict known as OperationIraqiFreedom, created quite a stir in January 2003
when he declared there was no evidence that the Iraqis had weapons of mass
destruction and the war was a huge mistake. In the midst of this publicity, reports
surfaced that Ritter had been arrested in 2001 for trying to lure a teenage girl he had
met on the internet. When asked about the incident by CNN reporter Aaron Brown
he replied,
Aaron, we're dealing with a case that has been dismissed and the
record has been sealed by a judge's order. And I'm obligated,
both ethically and legally, not to talk about that case.65
Reporter Brown persisted:
Scott, we spent a fair amount of time today looking at New York
law on this. There is nothing in a sealed case, zero, that prevents
you from talking about it. The point of the seal is to protect you
from the state, not to protect the state from you.
You can choose not to talk about the specifics of this. That's
always the right of the guest. But... I'm not sure what the ethical
question is ... talking
about it. And none of our lawyers can find
66

the legal one, OK?

After continuing to refuse to discuss the case, Ritter concluded by saying,
"[T]he file was sealed. End of story. "67
Similarly, entertainer Michael Jackson was once the defendant in a case
involving allegations of sexual misconduct with a thirteen-year-old boy. The case
was settled with an agreement of confidentiality. When later asked about the
68
charges, Jackson said that he was "not allowed to talk about [it] by way of law.
As American citizens, Ritter and Jackson have an absolute right to
privacy-they can tell any interviewer that they would prefer not to discuss

65. CNN NewsNight with Aaron Brown (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 22, 2003), availableat
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=30634 (last visited Apr. 2, 2004) (on
file with author).

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 20/20: Living with MichaelJackson (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 6, 2003).
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allegations about their past conduct. 6 But do they have a right to a court order
compelling confidentiality, thereby enabling them to convey the misleading
impression that they would be delighted to discuss the alleged scandal, but "the
judge" or "the law" will not let them?
Another example of the misuse of court-ordered secrecy occurred in a plane
crash case that I tried in 1997.7 o USAir Flight 1016 flew into a micro burst and
crashed near Charlotte, North Carolina, on July 2, 1994. "Of the fifty-seven
passengers on board, thirty-seven were killed and the rest were [seriously]
injured.",7' All cases were transferred to me for resolution of pretrial issues pursuant
to the multidistrict litigation statute.7 2 While the cases were pending before me, all
parties consented to a transfer of all cases to the District of South Carolina for a
consolidated trial on the issue of liability. The plaintiffs asserted claims against two
defendants, USAir, for pilot error, and the United States government, for the
7
negligent acts of its air traffic controllers in failing to warn of the storm. "
During the pretrial stages of the case, the United States admitted that the
negligence of the air traffic controllers was a proximate cause of the crash. In an
ex parte conference requested by the defendants, the court was informed that the
admission of liability by the government was part of a carefully crafted settlement
agreement worked out between the two defendants. Although the government had
admitted its liability for the accident, the parties agreed between themselves to
share, on a percentage basis, payment for any settlement or judgment obtained by
any of the plaintiffs.74 The government would pay thirty percent and USAir would
pay seventy percent.
At the court's urging, the defendants reluctantly agreed to provide the terms of
the settlement between the defendants to the plaintiffs' Steering Committee but
persuaded me to temporarily order the Steering Committee not to share the
information with other counsel of record.
Shortly before trial, USAir announced that it intended to introduce the
government's admission of liability in the trial before the jury. It then became
apparent how and why the parties had structured their settlement the way they did,
75
and why they wanted it to be kept from the plaintiffs' counsel and the public. As
I noted at the time,

69. I acknowledge that by using Ritter and Jackson as examples of public figures who have
hidden behind court secrecy orders to refuse to discuss allegations about conduct that is normally
reported only in supermarket tabloids, I play into the hands of those who say that antisecrecy reforms
only benefit gossip mongers. My sole reason for quoting from their interviews is that Ritter and Jackson
are among the few who will actually comment on secrecy orders they persuaded a judge to sign. The
vast majority of litigants who obtain such orders are savvy enough to refrain from such remarks.
70. In re Air Crash at Charlotte, N.C., on July 2, 1994, 982 F. Supp. 1060, 1061 (D.S.C. 1996).
71. Id.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
73. In re Air Crash at Charlotte, N.C., on July 2, 1994, 982 F. Supp. at 1062.
74. Id. at 1063.
75. Id. at 1064-65.
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[T]he effect of the settlement agreement, coupled with the
admission, is to place both parties in a better position than they
might otherwise be in if found liable. Certainly, as to actual
damages, either party is invariably better off with some agreement
to split actual damages than it would be if found solely liable.
Under the settlement agreement here, however, the Government
is actually in a better position than if both USAir and the
Government were found liable. Thus, the Government gave up
nothing in making the admission if considered in light of the
settlement agreement and if it believed it would be held either
solely or even jointly responsible.
USAir also gains a benefit in the bargain not only by insuring
the Government will pay at least some portion of any actual
damages judgment, but also by limiting the probability of punitive
damages awards and the risk of a runaway actual damages verdict.
This is because while the Government would, if found liable, be
subject only to a nonjury trial for actual damages, USAir could
potentially be held liable for punitive damages, with both actual
and punitive damages being decided by a jury. Thus, if USAir
and the United States could agree to have one of them be found
liable, rather than the other, with an agreement to split any actual
damages on some percentage basis, conventional wisdom would
76
dictate shifting liability to the United States.
As a result, I made the settlement agreement available to all plaintiffs of record
and held that if, at the trial before the jury, USAir attempted to introduce the
government's admission of liability, the plaintiffs would have the option of
introducing the settlement agreement in rebuttal."

Meanwhile, the news media in South Carolina attempted to obtain a copy of the
settlement agreement pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act.7" I learned, to
my surprise, that the government had resisted compliance with the Freedom of
Information Act, citing my tentative and very temporary order directing the
plaintiffs' Steering Committee not to share the information with other plaintiffs'
counsel. In other words, a confidentiality order I entered in good faith was used for
other purposes. Upon application of various news media sources, I relaxed the order
prohibiting plaintiffs' Steering Committee from discussing the contents of the
agreement and indicated my frustration that my order had been used to obstruct a
legitimate Freedom of Information Act request.79

76. Id. at 1065-66.
77. Id. at 1071.
78. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
79. Exparte Knight Ridder, Inc., Air Crash at Charlotte, N.C. on July 2, 1994, 982 F. Supp.
1080, 1083-84 (D.S.C. 1997).
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I can attest to one episode where attorneys fabricated court-ordered secrecy out
of thin air. I presided over a fraud case between a local school district and a
computer company.8" Both sides claimed millions of dollars from the other and the
case worked its way through the machinery of the court system for nearly three
years. On the day of the pretrial conference, the parties announced a settlement:
The computer company, by now nearly insolvent, would pay the school district
$75,000 over a period of time. Fortunately, the settlement was announced in open
court with a court reporter present. Because of the nature of the case, I told the
attorneys that there was nothing for me to approve, and "all I can do is let you put
[it] on the record."'" The attorney for the computer company then said:
The other thing [the plaintiff's attorney] asked is something about
not disclosing the terms of the settlement until the settlement
documents are signed. I don't have any problem with that as long
as I know we are all going to abide by that. There is no
confidentiality in the case. Indeed these are public funds. At
some point anybody can say what they want to. I will agree with
[the attorney's] suggestion.82
I then entered a standard order of dismissal.83
Imagine my surprise nine days later when I read a short newspaper article about
the case which contained the following passage:
Attorneys from both sides were tight-lipped about the terms of the
settlement. [The attorney for the plaintiff] said U.S. District Judge
Joe Anderson barred him from speaking about the settlement
84

I cannot fathom why any attorney would be reluctant to talk about a relatively
modest settlement in what was essentially a breach of contract claim, dressed up (as
many of them are) as a fraud claim. Indeed, as the attorneys noted at the pretrial
conference, since the school district in that case is a public entity, court-ordered
secrecy regarding the settlement is prohibited by law.85 Yet, for whatever reason,

80. Chester County Sch. Dist. v. Edutek Educ. Solutions, Inc., C/A No. 0:00-2703 (D.S.C.).
81. Id. (transcript of May 1, 2003 Pretrial Conference, at 7).

82. Id.
83. Chester County Sch. Dist. v. Edutek Educ. Solutions, Inc., C/A No. 0:00-2703 (D.S.C. May
6, 2003) (order of dismissal).
84. District,Computer Firm Reach Settlement, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), May 10, 2003, at

B3.
85. 1988 S.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 103 (Apr. 11, 1988) ("[S]ettlement documents for a lawsuit
wherein public funds have been expended by a government agency are 'public records' subject to
The federal government has a similar policy. See infra note 92 and accompanying
disclosure .. ").
text.
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the attorneys literally conjured up a court order regarding secrecy where one did not
exist, then used that mythical order to hide behind, just as Ritter and Jackson did,
when questioned by the news media. Apparently "the judge made me do it" is the
one answer that will silence even the most inquisitive reporters.
F. "Sealed Settlements Are Rare"
Opponents of sunshine regimes suggest that a quick review of the appropriate
index in the clerk's office reveals it is rare for a judge to impose a gag order at
settlement. I will concede that the vast majority of cases are settled openly. I would
also contend, however, that the number of sealed settlements is greater than the
index books or docket sheets would suggest. There is no standard procedure for
designating settlements as sealed settlements in the index: Sometimes the index
entry denotes that a settlement has been sealed, but sometimes it merely denotes an
order approving a settlement. It is not until one seeks to retrieve the order, when the
file package is produced from the bowels of the courthouse, that one learns that the
settlement, or some aspect of the file, has been sealed. Even worse, sometimes the
order approving and sealing the settlement does not appear as an entry on the docket
sheet at all, as was true with the go-cart case mentioned earlier.8 6
In a four-part series on court-ordered secrecy, the Washington Post reported
that "[n]o local courthouse [in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area] keeps a
publicly available record of which lawsuits are sealed, and internal record-keeping
is so haphazard that most of the courts could not provide reliable figures. 8' 7 I
believe the same is true in many courthouses around the country. Accordingly,
most statistics on court-ordered secrecy should be reviewed with a degree of
skepticism. As Judge John S. Martin, Jr. of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York has observed,
One of the problems with secret proceedings is that they are
secret. If the secrecy really works, then the press is not aware of
the proceeding and cannot do its job ....
[I]f a proceeding is truly
secret, and the only ones who are aware of it are the parties who
want to keep it secret and the court, then the only one who can
look at the question of whether there is a legitimate interest in
keeping it secret is the court.88
Moreover, even if confidential settlements are occurring in only a small number
of cases, the regrettable fact is that those cases are often the very cases not
deserving of court-ordered secrecy. There is little concern about confidentiality in

86. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
87. Walsh & Weiser, supranote 1.
88. Secrecy and the Courts: The Judges Perspective,supra note 4, at 177.
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cases involving a decision of whether some provision of the Internal Revenue Code
is retroactive, but an auto dealer found to have rolled back odometers (who wants
to remain in business) will want his settlement, and the evidence proving the
9
wrongful conduct, sealed by court order.8 It would be rare for a judge to be asked
for court-ordered secrecy in a case involving the collection of a past due student
loan, but that same judge will be told that the return and destruction of all
documents is the sine qua non of a settlement of a groundwater contamination case.
G. "Rule 5.03(c) Discriminates Against Those Who Must Have Their
SettlementsApproved-Those Whom the Law OtherwiseSeeks to Protect"
It has been argued that Rule 5.03(c) harms those whom the law otherwise seeks
to protect: minors, incompetents, and decedents' estates, for example-those who
by law must have their settlements approved by a court. Because existing rules
require that these litigants spread the resolution of their cases on the public record,
so the argument goes, Rule 5.03(c), which prohibits the sealing of these settlements,
discriminates unfairly against those who are most deserving of the law's protection.
This argument also misses the mark. True, minors, incompetents, and
decedents' estates could be said to be deserving of the law's solicitude, but in South
Carolina and most other jurisdictions, these litigants are represented by someone
with a fiduciary duty (guardian, conservator, personal representative, or executor)
who must, under existing rules, file annual accountings with the probate court.
These accountings, which would include the amount of any wrongful death or
90
personal injury settlement, are public documents. In other words, plaintiffs in
these types of cases already operate under court rules that require openness.
H. "The PlaintiffNeeds Court-OrderedSecrecy"
One argument-often the only argument-advanced by the litigants who come
before my court seeking a consent order of secrecy is that the plaintiff needs to have
the amount of the settlement kept confidential to protect the plaintiff from greedy
relatives, telemarketers, would-be burglars, and the like. In other words, the
plaintiff does not want the world to know that he or she has recently come into a
sum of money. This strikes me as a weak argument in cases where the plaintiff has
sustained personal injury and there is the distinct possibility that others will be
injured in similar fashion. In other words, when balancing the equities in such a

89. I received such a request, which I did not accede to, in an odometer roll back case, but I have
not been able to locate my file on that case.
90. See Letter from Amy McCulloch, Probate Judge, Richland County, South Carolina, to Joseph
F. Anderson Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina (Nov. 1, 2002) (on
file with author) (confirming that, with the exception of personal information such as birth dates,
addresses, and account numbers which are sometimes redacted, all probate court records are public
documents).
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settlement, the judge should almost always strike the balance in favor of openness.
If news articles are to be believed, however, judges have not done so in cases
involving defective tires and abusive members of the clergy. 9 Openness has not
been favored in cases of which I have direct knowledge.92
Moreover, the desire to protect someone from relatives, telemarketers, and
burglars could also be used to keep secret the names of the winners of state-run
lotteries. Yet no one would seriously argue that the names of lottery winners should
be shrouded in secrecy enforced by the government. Public confidence in the
operation of a lottery is based in large measure on the open way lotteries are
conducted and the way winnings are announced. Public confidence in the
administration of justice likewise depends, at least in part, on the way it conducts
the public's business in public.

IV. THE NEED FOR SUNSHINE
Openness is an important feature of the American legal system. The federal
government, a frequent litigant in federal court, has a firmly established policy
against participating in secret settlements,93 as do many states.94 The Supreme
Court has observed that "justice cannot survive behind walls of silence."9' The right
of public access to court documents and proceedings derives from two independent
sources: the common law and the First Amendment. The common law presumes
a right of public access to inspect and copy all judicial records and documents.96
A court may seal judicial documents if competing interests outweigh the public's
common law right of access. 97

Unlike the common law right, the First Amendment guarantee of access has a
more limited scope that "has been extended only to particular judicial records and
documents." 98 The right of access attaches under the First Amendment if: (1) "the
place and process have historically been open to the press and general public;" and
(2) "public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the

91. See supra note 35.
92. See supra notes 12 through 15 and accompanying text.
93. The government's official policy provides in part:
(a) It is the policy of the Department of Justice that, in any civil matter in which
the Department is representing the interests of the United States or its agencies,
it will not enter into final settlement agreements or consent decrees that are
subject to confidentiality provisions, nor will it seek or concur in the sealing of
such documents. This policy flows from the principle of openness in government
and is consistent with the Department's policies regarding openness in judicial
proceedings (see 28 CFR 50.9) and the Freedom of Information Act ....
28 C.F.R. § 50.23 (2003).
94. See supra note 40.
95. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349 (1966).
96. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
97. Id. at 598-99, 602-03; In re Knight Publ'g Co., 743 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984).
98. Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178, 180 (4th Cir. 1988).
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particular process in question."99 The First Amendment guarantee of access,
however, provides more of a presumption for openness than the common law right
because before sealing may occur, "it must be shown that the denial [of access] is
necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest."1°°
These well-established legal principles are obviously grounded upon the fact
that courts are publicly-funded institutions of government. Openness in judicial
proceedings fosters a greater understanding of, and appreciation for, our legal
system. More importantly, it provides a check on unbridled judicial power.
Parties to a dispute who wish to avoid the glare of publicity are free to engage
in private mediation or arbitration and keep the proceedings and results secret. But
when they invoke the machinery of the American legal system and ask a judicial
officer and a group of conscripted fellow citizens to intervene and resolve their
differences, they should, in my view, face major hurdles when they seek to have the
court order that documents they authored prior to trial and more importantly,
pleadings and memoranda they filed with the court, be protected from public
disclosure.
It is for just these reasons that a body of law has developed establishing
procedures for trial courts to follow when considering requests to seal documents.
Typical of these cases is the seminal Fourth Circuit case ofIn re Knight Publishing
Company.' Knight and its progeny generally require that the court provide notice
of a request to seal documents and an opportunity to object to the request before the
court makes its decision. 0 2 Also, the court must state the "reasons for its decision
to seal supported by specific findings, and the reasons for rejecting alternatives to
3
sealing in order to provide an adequate record for review."'
By far the greatest weakness in the procedure established by Knight is the
watered-down notice provision. The Knight court said,
[W]e believe individual notice is unwarranted. Notifying the
persons present in the courtroom of the request to seal or
docketing it reasonably in advance of deciding the issue is
appropriate. "
To the extent the procedure established in Knight allows notice to "persons
present in the courtroom," it is a hollow requirement indeed. Presumably, a party

99. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986), quoted in Balt. Sun Co. v.
Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989).
100. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982); Stone, 855 F.2d at
180.
101. 743 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1984).
102. The authority to seal is the protective order provision of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
103. Knight, 743 F.2d at 235.
104. Id. (emphasis added).
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seeking to keep a document from public view need only turn, face the audience in
the gallery, and announce that he or she wishes to file a document under seal, and
the notice requirement is satisfied. This totally unworkable approach stems from
the popular misconception, first seen in the Perry Mason television series and
repeated in virtually all television and movie dramas that followed, that spectators
crowd the galleries of America's courtrooms dutifully watching the proceedings.
As I or any other trial judge can attest, it is a rare case indeed where trials, much
less motions hearings, attract even a small audience of onlookers to whom notice
can be given.
The lack of any real notice provision makes it easier for litigants, and compliant
judges, to avoid altogether or give token consideration to the procedural
requirements of Knight. The docket sheets for the go-cart and pharmaceutical cases
mentioned in Part II of this Article, for example, reveal that the procedures of
Knight were not followed in any respect.
Let me be clear: No court is going to deny a request to keep from public view
social security numbers, customer lists, proprietary information, income tax returns,
or the formula for Coca-Cola. Divorce records should belong to no one but the
litigants in those cases. Grand jury proceedings always have been and always
should be secret. There are times when, because of the nature of the proceeding,
a courtroom must be closed. I have no real objection to keeping the amount of the
settlement confidential in most cases, to minimize the possibility of frivolous
copycat suits.
But suppose a letter surfaces during discovery wherein a manufacturer is asked,
"[W]hat is going on? Do we have to have a fatality before any action is taken on
this subject?"' 5 What justification can be given for ajudge orderingthat this letter
be filed under seal with the court or ordering that upon settlement of the case, the
letter be returned and destroyed?
If a member of the clergy discloses that he enticed teenagers to have sex with
him by claiming to be the Second Coming of Christ or trades cocaine for sex,
should the government of the United States, through its court system, stifle this
information?' 6
When a firm disposes of hazardous waste, injuring nearby residents, should the
discovery obtained by the first plaintiff to bring an action be hidden from later
0 7
litigants by court order?"

In my view, there are four compelling reasons that courts should avoid overutilization of the authority given them to seal documents filed with the court and

105. This question is from an actual letter that was originally placed under a protective order in
one of the Bridgestone/Firestone tire cases. It has now been unsealed.
106. The conduct of the priest described herein was reported in the news media. See, e.g., Thomas
Farragher & Sacha Pfeiffer, More Clergy Abuse. Secrecy Cases: Records Detail Quiet Shifting of
Rogue Priests,BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 2002, at Al. I do not know if these priests were involved in

any of the early Catholic Church lawsuits.
107. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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information associated with settlements: duplicative discovery, public safety, the
need to keep our own house in order, and public confidence in the legal system.
A.

DuplicativeDiscovery

It cannot be gainsaid that liberalized discovery rules have racheted up the cost
of civil litigation in the United States. Despite the best efforts of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules and other similar bodies, expensive and time-consuming

discovery is the hallmark of most civil cases.'o8 As Judge Patrick Higginbotham has
observed, "The discovery beast has yet to be tamed."' 9
Additionally, refereeing contentious discovery disputes is, I sense, perhaps the
most unwelcome aspect of a trial judge's work,' 0 and many district judges relegate
this work to magistrate judges. Additionally, inflation appears to be setting in: In
past years during oral argument on a motion to compel discovery, inevitably one of

the attorneys would, sometime during the argument, implore, "Your honor, you
must understand ... we are talking about literally thousands and thousands of
documents!"

In recent months, however, I have learned that requests for an opponent's
electronic mail communications are now in vogue, prompting one attorney to
suggest to me at a discovery hearing that, including the request for electronic mail
communications, a production request was "likely to exceed one million pages.'

2
The point is that the parties often overreach in their discovery requests" and

108. See, e.g., JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF
JUDICIALCASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT I (Rand 1996) (concluding that
Congress's landmark legislation [the 1991 Civil Justice Reform Act] "had little effect on time to
disposition, litigation costs, and attorneys' satisfaction and views of the fairness of case management").
109. Higginbotham, supra note 50, at 1417.
110. One of my colleagues, United States District Judge Wayne Alley, once vented his
displeasure with discovery battles in the following order:
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Continue Trial is denied. If the
recitals in the briefs from both sides are accepted at face value, neither side has conducted
discovery according to the letter and spirit of the Oklahoma County Bar Association
Lawyer's Creed. This is an aspirational creed not subject to enforcement by this Court, but
violative conduct does call for judicial disapprobation at least. If there is a hell to which
disputatious, uncivil, vituperative lawyers go, let it be one in which the damned are eternally
locked in discovery disputes with other lawyers of equally repugnant attributes.
Krueger v. Pelican Prod. Corp., C/A No. 87-2385-A (W.D. Okla. Feb. 24, 1989).
111. Crane v. Int'l Paper Co., C/A No. 3:02-3352 (D.S.C. Apr. 25, 2003) (defendant's motion
for protective order, at 2).
112. As one court colorfully observed: Even if one is entitled to embark on a fishing expedition,
one must at least use a "rod and reel, or even a reasonably sized net [; not] drain the pond and collect
the fish from the bottom." In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 77 F.R.D. 39, 42 (N.D.
Cal. 1977).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2004

33

South Carolina
LawCAROLINA
Review, Vol.
55, Iss.
4 [2004], Art. 3 [Vol. 55:711
SOUTH
LAW
REVIEW

stonewall any request from their opponent." 3 In other words, hardball discovery,
as prevalent as ever in my view, is costly to our system and consumes an inordinate
amount of judicial resources." 4
The problem is then exacerbated when judges consent to ordering the return of
documents when a case is settled. Quite plainly, this means that in any future
litigation involving the same issue (principally, but not always, in product liability
and environmental contamination cases) the litigants will bear the cost of
duplicative discovery. Nowhere is this more true than in cases where litigants,
principally defendants, have established "document repositories," entire buildings
where documents produced over the years are stored. The litigant in the first case
seeks production of documents and is handed the key to the document repository.
When the case is over, the documents go back, and the "needle in the haystack"
process is repeated, at great expense, in each subsequent case." 5
The burden on the judiciary is repeated as well. I know of nothing more time
consuming than pouring through boxes of documents in an effort to be fair on a
ruling concerning work product and similar issues. Judges who accede to a request
that they order a return of documents after determining that the documents may be
used at trial virtually guarantee that subsequent judges, facing the same issues, will
needlessly expend time and resources answering the same questions.
One example from my own docket is illustrative: In 1990, I presided over the
two week trial of an asbestos property damage abatement case." 6 There were
numerous discovery skirmishes during the pretrial phase of the case. What
documents were relevant? What documents were protected by a privilege? Were
certain so-called "smoking gun" documents made by a corporate predecessor
attributable to the present defendant? Should defendants be required to produce an
index to its document repository? These issues, and others like them, consumed a

113. I have presided over one discovery dispute where the defendant's attorney objected to an
interrogatory, which essentially sought the names of witnesses, on the grounds that it was burdensome
and oppressive, while at the same time propounding an identically worded question in his own
interrogatories.
114. I have, on occasion, attempted to avoid duplication of effort by requiring a party to disclose
to me if there were prior rulings on discoverability by other judges in cases involving essentially

identical claims. Such efforts by me are usually unsuccessful. I am told that litigants have no way of
retrieving or assimilating discovery rulings by other judges in related litigation.
115. Another judge has shared with me a copy of a letter, written from one attorney to a group

of co-counsel and designated "Attorney Work Product - Confidential/Privileged," that pointedly
illustrates the tactics employed by some litigants. The letter provides, in part:
[T]he aggressive posture we have taken regarding depositions and discovery in general
continues to make these cases extremely burdensome and expensive for plaintiffs' lawyers,
particularly sole practitioners. To paraphrase General Patton, the way we won these cases

was not by spending all of [our client's] money, but by making that other son of a bitch
spend all his.
Because this letter was shared with me by another judge and is designated as confidential, I am not at

liberty to identify the author or recipients. I do, however, have a copy of it in my possession.
116. BlueCross BlueShield of S.C. v. W.R. Grace & Co., C/A No. 6:89-1287 (D.S.C.).
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significant amount of my time. My task was made all the more frustrating when I
learned that another federal judge had wrestled with virtually identical issues in a
case involving the same product, against the same defendants, and asserting the
same claims for relief two years earlier. But I did not have the luxury of building
upon that judge's work because, when his case settled, he ordered all documents to
be returned and prohibited the sharing of information. I learned of the existence of
the other case when the plaintiff s attorney in the asbestos case before me requested
that I open the records in the other judge's case. I declined the request because I
was powerless to do so.
One of my colleagues, United States Magistrate Judge George C. Kosko, is
currently handling a civil action against an insurance company. 7 By aggressively
pursuing the issue, he has learned that many of the same discovery issues he is
facing have been dealt with by other judges in at least four previous cases against
the same defendant." 8 In one of these earlier cases, a "consent confidentiality
protective order" actually provides:
In the event that any recipient of Confidential Information... is
served with a request or a demand or any other legal process by
one not a party to this case concerning Confidential Information
subject to this Order, that person ... shall object on the basis of
this Order to producing or responding to any such request,
demand, or subpoena." 9
In essence, Judge Kosko is expressly prohibited from utilizing the discovery
rulings of an earlier judge because the earlierjudge barred the use of the documents
in later litigation and, in fact, directed that any party faced with a request to share
information, object, and cite the judge's confidentiality order as the basis for the
objection.
It should be noted that I have no quarrel with what are generally termed
"umbrella" protective orders under which all documents exchanged during
discovery will be kept confidential while they are in the hands of the attorneys. Such
orders are expressly provided for in Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and allow for the early exchange of information without the involvement
of a judge ruling on the discovery request document by document.
It is only when one party wishes to make use of a document, by filing it with

117. Hare v. Unum Provident Corp., C/A No. 9:02-00346 (D.S.C. 2003).
118. Civatte v. Unum Provident Corp., No. 4:00-CV-116-H(3) (E.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 2002)
(Protective Order entered); Hand v. Unum Provident Corp., No. 3:01CV267WS (S.D. Miss. Oct. 3,
2001) (Protective Order entered); Chapman v. Unum Provident Corp., No. CV012323 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Dec. 12,2002) (Protective Order entered); Bellone v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. L-267997 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Oct. 15, 2001) (Protective Order entered).
119. Bellone v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. L-2679-97 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
Oct. 15, 2001).
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the court or referring to it in memoranda or other court documents, that concerns
about duplicative discovery arise. If, after a painstaking search through an
opponent's document repository and an expensive and bruising court battle over
relevancy, authenticity, and admissibility, a court determines that a group of
documents may be used at trial, that court should be wary of indiscriminately
allowing the party to file those documents under seal. It should be even more
cautious, in my view, when asked upon the conclusion of the case to order that the
documents that have been determined to be germane to the case be returned,

destroyed, or otherwise hidden from later litigants and judges who might be called
upon to travel down the same litigation path.
B. Keeping Our Own House in Order

Most judges are of the opinion that, left to our own devices, we are able to keep
our house in order and make changes to our rules and procedures when
circumstances warrant. Members of the judiciary often bristle at attempts by the
political branches to impose changes in our rules directly by legislation. To give
just two examples, most federal judges have, in recent years, strongly opposed
proposed legislation that would require judges to allow attorneys to conduct their
own voir dire during jury selection ° or allow cameras in the courtroom.' 2 '
It appears to me that there is somewhat of a groundswell of public opinion
against courts entering secrecy orders. Many of the jurisdictions that have adopted
antisecrecy rules have done so not by court initiative, but by legislative act.' 22 On
the national level, United States Senator Herb Kohl has, for nearly a decade,
persistently, but unsuccessfully, championed federal legislation to keep court
records open.'23

120. S. 863, 102d Cong. (1991) (requiring the court to permit plaintiff and defendant or their
attorneys thirty minutes for voir dire of prospective jurors).
121. H.R. 2155, 108th Cong. (2003) (allowing media coverage of court proceedings).
122. See supra note 40.
123. The text of Senator Kohl's bill currently pending before the Senate reads as follows:
Sec. 1660 ... (a)(1) A court shall not enter an order under rule 26(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure restricting the disclosure of information
obtained through discovery, an order approving a settlement agreement that would
restrict the disclosure of such information, or an order restricting access to court
records in a civil case unless the court has made findings of fact that(A) such order would not restrict the disclosure of information which
is relevant to the protection of public health or safety; or
(B)(i) the public interest in the disclosure of potential health or safety
hazards is outweighed by a specific and substantial interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of the information or records in
question; and
(ii) the requested protective order is no broader than necessary to
protect the privacy interest asserted.
(2) No order entered in accordance with paragraph (1), other than an order
approving a settlement agreement, shall continue in effect after the entry of final
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My instincts tell me that ifjudges do not adopt a more common sense approach
towards confidentiality in court records, then the trend towards antisecrecy
legislation will continue. The news media, in particular, continues to beat the drum
for openness and the issue is not going to go away. The general public is not going
to be concerned with arcane matters such as attorney-conducted voir dire, but pleas
from consumers who contend they were injured by a product, the defects of which
were allegedly kept secret by court order,'24 will likely fall upon receptive ears. In

judgment, unless at the time of, or after, such entry the court makes a separate
finding of fact that the requirements of paragraph (1) have been met.
(3) The party who is the proponent for the entry of an order, as provided under
this section, shall have the burden of proof in obtaining such an order.
(4) This section shall apply even if an order under paragraph (1) is requested-(A) by motion pursuant to rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure; or
(B) by application pursuant to the stipulation of the parties.
(5)(A) The provisions of this section shall not constitute grounds for the
withholding of information in discovery that is otherwise discoverable under rule
26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(B) No party shall request, as a condition for the production of discovery, that
another party stipulate to an order that would violate this section.
(b)(l) A court shall not approve or enforce any provision of an agreement
between or among parties to a civil action, or approve or enforce an order subject
to subsection (a)(1), that prohibits or otherwise restricts a party from disclosing
any information relevant to such civil action to any Federal or State agency with
authority to enforce laws regulating an activity relating to such information.
(2) Any such information disclosed to a Federal or State agency shall be
confidential to the extent provided by law.
(c)(l) Subject to paragraph (2), a court shall not enforce any provision of a
settlement agreement between or among parties that prohibits 1 or more parties
from(A) disclosing that a settlement was reached or the terms of such settlement,
other than the amount of money paid; or
(B) discussing a case, or evidence produced in the case, that involves
matters related to public health or safety.
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply if the court has made findings of fact that the
public interest in the disclosure of potential health or safety hazards is outweighed
by a specific and substantial interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the
information.'.
(b) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT- The table of sections
for chapter 111 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding after the
item relating to section 1659 the following:
1660. Restrictions on protective orders and sealing of cases and
settlements.'.
Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2003, S. 817, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003).
124. See, e.g., Court Secrecy: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice,
S. Comm. on the Judiciary 101st Cong. 101-1139 (1990). Representative of the testimony given at
previous hearings are the following excerpts:
I learned that many of their families had filed lawsuits against Shiley and Pfizer.
I also learned that documents and information obtained in those lawsuits were
never made public because of agreements or court orders which kept the
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short, if we judges continue to ignore this issue, we may well have changes forced
upon us by the political branches of government.
C. Public Safety
Critics of sunshine reforms have long argued that there is scant evidence that
court-ordered secrecy is inimical to public safety. They suggest that the job of

investigating and disclosing adverse risks to consumers is best left to regulatory
agencies.
I will concede that it is not the primary function of the legal system to act as a
roving ombudsman, seeking to ferret out and report dangerous products or
wrongdoers who repeatedly prey upon vulnerable victims. 25 But when clearly
defective products or repeat wrongdoers are clearly exposed as a case works its way
through the cogs and gears of the legal system, should that system throw a blanket

information secret. I learned that Shiley had settled every fracture case out of
court and, in each and every settlement, had required that the victims keep the
settlements totally confidential.
Id. at 7 (statement of Frederick R. Barbee).
They have now provided sworn statements that throughout their years of
litigation, McNeil protected them with court secrecy from ever having to be
deposed, and used judicially sanctioned secrecy to prevent them from disclosing
the fact that they had all along urged-far earlier than, in fact, the company had
acted-that actions be taken to pull the drug from the market.
Id. at 18 (statement of Devra Lee Davis).
From our experience, it seems that big business dominates this discussion ofcourt
secrecy and the experiences of average people aren't heard. We urge the
committee not to be intimidated by big business interests and listen to the voices
of the victims who are the silent majority. Moreover, if something isn't done
about changing the law, many more families will suffer as we have. We urge the
subcommittee to work on getting more information to the public. There are
already so many defective products which have been hidden by secrecy orders and
we need a change. We need less secrecy in our courts, not more.
The Sunshine in Litigation Act: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice,S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 103-1049 (1994) (statement of Leonard and Arleen Schmidt).
125. The regulatory process does not always protect the consuming public. I once tried a case in
which an insulation product used in farm buildings, advertised to be flame-resistant, was actually
determined by the Federal Trade Commission to be highly flammable. As a result, the Federal Trade
Commission ordered the manufacturer to warn all of its prior customers about the problem. This was
not done, and a large agricultural operation in upstate South Carolina that should have received the
warning burned to the ground after a spark ignited the insulation product. The failure of the
manufacturer to comply with the FTC warning requirement was brought out during the trial. During
deliberations, the jury sent out a question asking whether it could require the defendant to send, by
registered mail, the warning the FTC had unsuccessfully required of the manufacturer. I responded to
thejury that this was not their function and thejury responded with a $3 million punitive damage award
(subsequently reduced by me to aS 1.2 million punitive award). Spearman v. Apache Building Products,
C/A No. 8:86-1504 (D.S.C. 1986).
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of secrecy over the product defect or the malfeasance of the actor once the litigation
has run its course?
Critics suggest that antisecrecy proponents are merely tilting at windmills,
because the only thing generally sealed at settlement is the amount of money that
changes hands. They suggest that dangers revealed by the case can just as easily be
learned by reviewing the complaint and other documents. I have already noted that,
generally speaking, I do not object to litigants keeping the amount of a settlement
confidential. At times, however, the amount can be quite telling. The go-cart case
referred to in Part II of this Article, for example, settled for $1.4 million-not an
insubstantial sum. Interested consumers could look at the complaint and other
preliminary documents filed in the case to learn of the allegations about the product
defect. The trouble is, of course, that there are hundreds of thousands of cases filed
in the courts of the United States annually, many of which result in summary
judgment for the defendant or a nuisance-value settlement. Consulting the files of
these cases would be of no real benefit. A $1.4 million settlement, however,
suggests to me that the claim of product defect was a colorable one at least, and also
tells me I would not want my child riding on the same model go-cart involved in
that case.
D. Public Confidence in the Legal System
There is no other government institution from which so much is expected as the
American system ofjustice. Covered extensively by the media, monitored closely
by the public-at-large, and administered by men and women of differing
philosophies, our system always has been and always will be a subject of debate,
both within and without its ranks. Looking back on my twenty-eight years at the
bar, I have come to the firm conclusion that the American people believe,
fundamentally and absolutely, in the rule of law.
Regrettably, in my view, recent events have served to undermine public
confidence in our legal system. "Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court" is
not a concept that sits well with a citizenry that reveres openness and honesty in
government. I will be the first to concede that news reports about court-ordered
secrecy are overblown and often long on opinion and short on facts. I do not
suggest that our court system is retreating to the days of the Star Chamber.
Opponents of secrecy reforms, however, should acknowledge that public
confidence in the legal system is fragile, and courts that readily acquiesce in consent
orders restricting public information about a case might be doing a disservice to our
system and bring about legislatively-mandated solutions that most professionals in
the legal system agree are not a good idea.
V.

CONCLUSION

Critics of sunshine regimes frequently contend that public access reformers
offer up nothing more than anecdotes, speculation, and conjecture. In this polemic,
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I have tried to answer these critics with citations to real cases and events. In doing
so, I have probably offended some of my brothers and sisters on the bench and
ruffled a few feathers of the powers-that-be on the United States Judicial
Conference and its committees. I do so not out of any mean spirit. We all share the
same goal-the continued refinement and improvement of the fairest and bestadministered system ofjustice in the world. As Charles Alan Wright has observed,
however, "[e]ven the best system of court rules cannot remain static."' 26
Court-ordered secrecy is an issue that we in the third branch of government
cannot overlook. True, court-ordered secrecy occurs in a small (though
underreported) number of cases. But it is usually the very cases that are
undeserving, primarily cases involving conduct with the potential for future harm,
in which government-enforced secrecy is sought.
Court rules disfavoring court-ordered secrecy in cases affecting public safety
are, in my view, the best judicial response to the trends described in this Article.
Short of that, judicial officers at all levels must be ever-conscious of the sometimes
harmful consequences-to future litigants and to our system of justice-of

acquiescing in court-ordered secrecy for the sake of a settlement. A judge's
signature represents a public act of a public official. Litigants should not be
allowed to appropriate that signature by merely handing up a consent order,
especially one that restricts access to information about the operation of the third
branch of government.

126. 20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE DESKBOOK § 65 (2002).
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A

STANDARDIZED CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
DIVISION

)
)
Plaintiff,

Civil Action No.

)
)

VS.

)

)
Defendant

[Consent] Confidentiality Order

)

)

[if by consent] Whereas, the parties to this Consent Confidentiality Order
("parties"), have stipulated that certain discovery material is and should be treated
as confidential, and have agreed to the terms of this order; accordingly, it is this __
ORDERED:
,20
day of
[if not fully by consent] Whereas, the parties to this action ("parties"), have
stipulated that certain discovery material is and should be treated as confidential,
and have requested that the court enter a confidentiality order; and whereas the
court has determined that the terms set forth herein are appropriate to protect the
respective interests of the parties, the public, and the court; accordingly, it is this__
ORDERED:
day of _20-,
1. Scope. All documents produced in the course of discovery, all responses
to discovery requests and all deposition testimony and deposition exhibits and any
other materials which may be subject to discovery (hereinafter collectively
"documents") shall be subject to this Order concerning confidential information as
set forth below.
2. Form and Timing of Designation. Confidential documents shall be so
designated by placing or affixing the word "CONFIDENTIAL" on the document
in a manner which will not interfere with the legibility of the document and which
will permit complete removal of the Confidential designation. Documents shall be
designated CONFIDENTIAL prior to, or contemporaneously with, the production
or disclosure of the documents [optional: except for documents produced for
inspection under the "Reading Room" provisions set forth in paragraph 4 below].
Inadvertent or unintentional production of documents without prior designation as
confidential shall not be deemed a waiver, in whole or in part, of the right to
designate documents as confidential as otherwise allowed by this Order.
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3. Documents Which May be Designated Confidential. Any party may
designate documents as confidential but only after review of the documents by an
attorney 27 who has, in good faith, determined that the documents contain
information protected from disclosure by statute, sensitive personal information,
trade secrets, or confidential research, development, or commercial information.
The certification shall be made concurrently with the disclosure of the documents,
using the form attached hereto at Attachment A which shall be executed subject to
the standards of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Information or
documents which are available in the public sector may not be designated as
confidential.
4. [The Reading Room provisions may be appropriate only in cases
involving extensive documents.] Reading Room. In order to facilitate timely
disclosure of large numbers of documents which may contain confidential
documents, but which have not yet been reviewed and marked, the following
"Reading Room" provisions may be utilized.
a. Documents may be produced for review at a party's facility or other
controlled location ("Reading Room") prior to designation as confidential.
After review of these documents, the party seeking discovery may specify those
for which further production is requested. The producing party shall then copy
the requested documents for production. To the extent any of the requested
documents warrant a CONFIDENTIAL designation, the copies shall be so
marked prior to further production.
b. Unless otherwise agreed or ordered, copies of Reading Room documents
shall be requested within twenty days of review in the Reading Room and shall
be produced within thirty days after the request is made.
c. The producing party shall maintain a log of persons who have reviewed
documents in the Reading Room and the dates and time of their presence.
d. The production of documents for review within the confines of a Reading
Room shall not be deemed a waiver of any claim of confidentiality, so long as
the reviewing parties are advised that the Reading Room production is pursuant
to this provision and that the Reading Room may contain confidential materials
which have not yet been marked as confidential.
e. Until such time as further production is made of documents reviewed in a
Reading Room, the reviewing party shall treat all material reviewed as if it was
marked CONFIDENTIAL at the time reviewed.
5. Depositions. Portions of depositions shall be deemed confidential only if
designated as such when the deposition is taken or within seven business days after
receipt of the transcript. Such designation shall be specific as to the portions to be
protected.
127. The attorney who reviews the documents and certifies them to be CONFIDENTIAL must
be admitted to the bar of at least one state but need not be admitted to practice in the District of South
Carolina and need not apply forprohac vice admission. By signing the certification, counsel submits
to the jurisdiction of this court in regard to the certification.
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6. Protection of Confidential Material.
a. General Protections. Documents designated CONFIDENTIAL under this
Order shall not be used or disclosed by the parties or counsel for the parties or
any other persons identified below ( 6.b.) for any purposes whatsoever other
than preparing for and conducting the litigation in which the documents were
disclosed (including any appeal of that litigation). The parties shall not disclose
documents designated as confidential to putative class members not named as
plaintiffs in putative class litigation unless and until one or more classes have
been certified.
b. Limited Third Party Disclosures. The parties and counsel for the parties
shall not disclose or permit the disclosure of any documents designated
CONFIDENTIAL under the terms of this Order to any other person or entity
except as set forth in subparagraphs (1)-(5) below, and then only after the
person to whom disclosure is to be made has executed an acknowledgment (in
the form set forth at Attachment B hereto), that he or she has read and
understands the terms of this Order and is bound by it. Subject to these
requirements, the following categories of persons may be allowed to review
documents which have been designated CONFIDENTIAL pursuant to this
Order:
(1) counsel and employees of counsel for the parties who have
responsibility for the preparation and trial of the lawsuit;
(2) parties and employees of a party to this Order but only to the extent
counsel shall certify that the specifically named individual party or
employee's assistance is necessary to the conduct of the litigation in which
the information is disclosed 2 ';
(3) court reporters engaged for depositions and those persons, if any,
specifically engaged for the limited purpose of making photocopies of
documents;
(4) consultants, investigators, or experts (hereinafter referred to
collectively as "experts") employed by the parties or counsel for the parties
to assist in the preparation and trial of the lawsuit; and
(5) other persons only upon consent of the producing party or upon order
of the court and on such conditions as are agreed to or ordered.
c. Control of Documents. Counsel for the parties shall take reasonable
efforts to prevent unauthorized disclosure of documents designated as
Confidential pursuant to the terms of this order. Counsel shall maintain a record
of those persons, including employees of counsel, who have reviewed or been
given access to the documents along with the originals of the forms signed by
those persons acknowledging their obligations under this Order.
128. At or prior to the time such party or employee completes his or her acknowledgment of
review of this Order and agreement to be bound by it (Attachment B hereto), counsel shall complete
a certification in the form shown at Attachment C hereto. Counsel shall retain the certification together
with the form signed by the party or employee.
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d. Copies. All copies, duplicates, extracts, summaries, or descriptions
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "copies") of documents designated as
Confidential under this Order or any portion of such a document, shall be
immediately affixed with the designation "CONFIDENTIAL" if the word does
not already appear on the copy. All such copies shall be afforded the full
protection of this Order.
7. Filing of Confidential Materials. In the event a party seeks to file any
material that is subject to protection under this Order with the court, that party shall
take appropriate action to insure that the documents receive proper protection from
public disclosure including: (1) filing a redacted document with the consent of the
party who designated the document as confidential; (2) where appropriate (e.g. in
relation to discovery and evidentiary motions), submitting the documents solely for
in camera review; or (3) where the preceding measures are not adequate, seeking
permission to file the document under seal pursuant to the procedural steps set forth
in Local Civil Rule 5.03, DSC, or such other rule or procedure as may apply in the
relevantjurisdiction. Absent extraordinary circumstances making prior consultation
impractical or inappropriate, the party seeking to submit the document to the court
shall first consult with counsel for the party who designated the document as
confidential to determine if some measure less restrictive than filing the document
under seal may serve to provide adequate protection. This duty exists irrespective
of the duty to consult on the underlying motion. Nothing in this Order shall be
construed as a prior directive to the Clerk of Court to allow any document be filed
under seal. The parties understand that documents may be filed under seal only with
the permission of the court after proper motion pursuant to Local Civil Rule 5.03.
8. Greater Protection of Specific Documents. No party may withhold
information from discovery on the ground that it requires protection greater than
that afforded by this Order unless the party moves for an Order providing such
special protection.
9. Challenges to Designation as Confidential. Any CONFIDENTIAL
designation is subject to challenge. The following procedures shall apply to any
such challenge.
a. The burden of proving the necessity of a Confidential designation remains
with the party asserting confidentiality.
b. A party who contends that documents designated CONFIDENTIAL are not
entitled to confidential treatment shall give written notice to the party who
affixed the designation of the specific basis for the challenge. The party who
so designated the documents shall have fifteen (15) days from service of the
written notice to determine if the dispute can be resolved without judicial
intervention and, if not, to move for an Order confirming the Confidential
designation.
c. Notwithstanding any challenge to the designation of documents as
confidential, all material previously designated CONFIDENTIAL shall
continue to be treated as subject to the full protections of this Order until one
of the following occurs:
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(1) the party who claims that the documents are confidential withdraws
such designation in writing;
(2) the party who claims that the documents are confidential fails to move
timely for an Order designating the documents as confidential as set forth
in paragraph 9.b. above; or
(3) the court rules that the documents should no longer be designated as
confidential information.
d. Challenges to the confidentiality of documents may be made at any time
and are not waived by the failure to raise the challenge at the time of initial
disclosure or designation.
10. Treatment on Conclusion of Litigation.
a. Order Remains in Effect. All provisions of this Order restricting the use
of documents designated CONFIDENTIAL shall continue to be binding after
the conclusion of the litigation unless otherwise agreed or ordered.
b. Return of CONFIDENTIAL Documents. Within thirty (30) days after
the conclusion of the litigation, including conclusion of any appeal, all
documents treated as confidential under this Order, including copies as defined
above ( 6.d.) shall be returned to the producing party unless: (1) the document
has been entered as evidence or filed (unless introduced or filed under seal); (2)
the parties stipulate to destruction in lieu of return; or (3) as to documents
containing the notations, summations, or other mental impressions of the
receiving party, that party elects destruction. Notwithstanding the above
requirements to return or destroy documents, counsel may retain attorney work
product including an index which refers or relates to information designated
CONFIDENTIAL so long as that work product does not duplicate verbatim
substantial portions of the text of confidential documents. This work product
continues to be Confidential under the terms ofthis Order. An attorney may use
his or her work product in a subsequent litigation provided that its use does not
disclose the confidential documents.
c. Documents Filed under Seal. The Clerk of Court may, at the conclusion
of the litigation including conclusion of any appeal, return to counsel for the
parties, or destroy, any materials filed under seal. Before destroying any
document filed under seal, the Clerk of Court shall advise all parties of their
option to accept return or destruction and shall allow no less than thirty (30)
days from issuance of the notice for counsel to respond. In the absence of a
response, the Clerk of Court may destroy documents filed under seal.
11. Order Subject to Modification. This Order shall be subject to
modification on motion of any party or any other person who may show an adequate
interest in the matter to intervene for purposes of addressing the scope and terms of
this Order. The Order shall not, however, be modified until the parties shall have
been given notice and an opportunity to be heard on the proposed modification.
12. No Judicial Determination. This Order is entered based on the
representations and agreements of the parties and for the purpose of facilitating
discovery. Nothing herein shall be construed or presented as a judicial
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determination that any specific document or item of information designated as
CONFIDENTIAL by counsel is subject to protection under Rule 26(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or otherwise until such time as a documentspecific ruling shall have been made.
13. [If by consent] Persons Bound. This Order shall take effect when entered
and shall be binding upon: (1) counsel who signed below and their respective law
firms; and (2) their respective clients.
[If not by consent] Persons Bound. This Order shall take effect when
entered and shall be binding upon all counsel in this action and their respective law
firms and clients.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
,20

South Carolina

[Delete Signature Blocks if not wholly by consent]

WE SO MOVE
and agree to abide by the
terms of this order

WE SO MOVE/CONSENT
and agree to abide by the
terms of this order

Signature

Signature

Printed Name

Printed Name

Counsel for

Counsel for

,200
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ATTACHMENT A
CERTIFICATION BY COUNSEL OF DESIGNATION
OF INFORMATION AS CONFIDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
DIVISION

)

Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)

Civil Action No.

Certification by Counsel of Designation
of Information as Confidential

)
Defendant

)

Documents produced herewith [whose bates numbers are listed below (or)
which are listed on the attached index] have been marked as CONFIDENTIAL
subject to the Confidentiality Order entered in this action which Order is dated
_,20_
By signing below, I am certifying that I have personally reviewed the marked
documents and believe, based on that review, that they are properly subject to
protection under the terms of Paragraph 3 of the Confidentiality Order.
Check and complete one of the two options below.

L

I am a member of the Bar of the United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina. My District Court Bar number is
I am not a member of the Bar of the United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina but am admitted to the bar of one or more states.
The state in which I conduct the majority of my practice is
where my Bar number is

. I understand that

by completing this certification I am submitting to the jurisdiction of the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina as to any
matter relating to this certification.
Date

Signature of Counsel
Printed Name of Counsel
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ATTACHMENT B
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF UNDERSTANDING
AND

AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
DIVISION

)

Civil Action No.

)
)

Acknowledgment of Understanding

)
Plaintiff,
vs.

)

and
Agreement to be Bound

)
Defendant )

)

The undersigned hereby acknowledges that he or she has read the
Confidentiality Order dated
, 20_, in the above captioned
action, understands the terms thereof, and agrees to be bound by such terms. The
undersigned submits to the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the

District of South Carolina in matters relating to the Confidentiality Order and
understands that the terms of said Order obligate him/her to use discovery materials
designated CONFIDENTIAL solely for the purposes of the above-captioned action,
and not to disclose any such confidential information to any other person, firm or
concern.
The undersigned acknowledges that violation of the Stipulated Confidentiality
Order may result in penalties for contempt of court.
Name:
Job Title:
Employer:
Business Address:

Date:

Signature
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ATTACHMENT C
CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL OF NEED
FOR ASSISTANCE OF PARTY/EMPLOYEE
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
DIVISION

Plaintiff,

Defendant

)
)
)

Civil Action No.
Certification of Counsel
of Need for Assistance of Party/Employee

)
)

Pursuant to the Confidentiality Order entered in this action, most particularly
the provisions of Paragraph 6.b.2., I certify that the assistance of
is reasonably necessary to the conduct
requires
the disclosure to this individual of
of this litigation and that this assistance
information which has been designated as CONFIDENTIAL.
I have explained the terms of the Confidentiality Order to the individual named
above and will obtain his or her signature on an "Acknowledgment of
Understanding and Agreement to be Bound" prior to releasing any confidential
documents to the named individual and I will release only such confidential
documents as are reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation.
The individual named above is:
L) A named party;
[I

An employee of named party
employee'sjob title is
is

. This
and work address

Date:
Signature
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